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Genevieve Lakier†
One of the most common criticisms of contemporary free speech law is that it
is too Lochnerian. What critics usually mean by this is that First Amendment doctrine, by extending significant constitutional protection to advertising and other
kinds of commercially oriented speech, makes the same mistake as the Supreme
Court made in Lochner v New York and other late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury Due Process Clause cases: namely, it grants judges too much power to
second-guess the economic policy decisions of democratically elected legislatures.
This Article challenges that argument—not to reject the idea that contemporary free speech law resurrects Lochner, but instead to reconceive what that means.
It argues that contemporary free speech law is not Lochner-like in failing to defer to
the legislature’s economic policy decisions. Instead, it repeats the errors of the
Lochner Court by relying upon an almost wholly negative notion of freedom of
speech and by assuming that the only relevant constitutional interest at stake in free
speech cases is the autonomy interest of the speaker. The result is a body of law that,
not just in its commercial and corporate speech cases, but in many other cases as
well, replicates Lochner-era due process jurisprudence in both its doctrinal structure
and its political economic effects.
What this means is that the First Amendment’s Lochner problem will not be
solved—as the conventional critiques suggest—by simply denying commercial and
corporate speech constitutional protection or by weakening the strength of the protection the First Amendment provides to speech of this kind. It will only be solved by
reconceiving freedom of speech as a positive rather than a negative right and one
that guarantees, to listeners as well as speakers, the right to participate in a public

† Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, The
University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen,
Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna
Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey
Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern
University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt
Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars
Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for
excellent research assistance.

1241

1242

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1241

sphere that is diverse along both racial and class lines. Rethinking the First Amendment in this manner, this Article argues, will raise many difficult questions and
make what are currently easy free speech cases much harder to resolve. But there is
ultimately no other way to vindicate the democratic values the First Amendment is
intended to protect.
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INTRODUCTION
The ghost of Lochner v New York1 haunts contemporary free
speech law. Over the past four decades, numerous scholars and
jurists have argued that the Supreme Court’s expansive free
speech jurisprudence “threatens to revive the long-lost world of
Lochner”;2 that it “reconstitute[s] the values of Lochner v. New
York as components of freedom of speech”;3 and that it “return[s]
[constitutional law] to the bygone [Lochner] era.”4 What critics
usually mean when they argue that contemporary free speech law
revives Lochner is that, by extending constitutional protection to
commercial advertising, to corporate speech, and to other kinds
of profit-oriented expression—or by extending too much protection to speech of this sort—contemporary free speech law repeats
1

198 US 45 (1905).
Robert Post and Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 Harv L
Rev F 165, 182 (2015).
3
Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries Jr, Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va L Rev 1, 30–31 (1979) (citation omitted).
4
Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 564 US 552, 591 (2011) (Breyer dissenting).
2
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the error the Court made in its 1905 decision in Lochner: it grants
judges too much power to second-guess the economic policy decisions of democratically elected legislatures. Like freedom of contract doctrine in the Lochner era, free speech law authorizes, on
this view, “an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into a realm
properly reserved to the political branches of government.”5
One can well understand why critics would want to analogize
contemporary free speech law to Lochner-era freedom of contract
jurisprudence. There are, after all, notable similarities in how the
two bodies of law have been mobilized, as well as the interests
they have been used to advance. Just as in the late nineteenthand early twentieth-centuries, when businesses invoked their
constitutional due process rights to protect economic interests
they could not protect via the ordinary political process, today
businesses invoke their First Amendment rights to do the same.6
And just as in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries,
when the success of businesses in making due process claims limited the government’s ability to regulate the market, the remarkable success that businesses have recently enjoyed as litigants in
First Amendment cases limits the government’s ability to regulate both the economic and political markets in order to promote
welfarist aims. Claims of First Amendment Lochnerism capture,
indisputably, close and interesting parallels in the role of courts
and constitutional adjudication between what some have called
the First and Second Gilded Ages.7
Yet, notwithstanding these historical parallels, there is reason to be skeptical of claims that the Court has revived Lochner
by extending too much constitutional protection to commercial
and corporate speech. Critics argue that rigorous scrutiny of
speech of this kind protects only economic liberty—the kind of liberty protected by the Lochner Court—and does little to protect the
political or personal liberty that the First Amendment values, but
this simply isn’t true. Although complicated arguments can be
made about whether protecting commercial advertising or the
nonadvertising speech of corporations does anything to advance
individual expressive freedom, there is no question that, when addressed to a public audience, speech of this kind can and does help
5

Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873, 874 (1987).
John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 Const Commen 223, 246–48 (2015).
7
See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 NYU L Rev 1, 25–26 (2004).
6
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to shape political attitudes and beliefs. This means that, when
courts closely scrutinize the government’s justifications in commercial and corporate speech cases, they do not simply protect
economic liberty; they also protect democratic interests that have
long been of central First Amendment concern.
This Article thus contests the claim that contemporary free
speech law resurrects Lochner by extending too much protection
to commercially oriented speech. It does so, however, not to challenge the idea that First Amendment doctrine enacts a species of
Lochnerism, but to recast it. It argues that First Amendment
scholars are not wrong when they assert that contemporary free
speech law repeats the errors of the Lochner Court; they
are simply wrong in what they identify as the error that is being
repeated.
Contemporary free speech law, this Article argues, is not
Lochner-like because it fails to show sufficient deference to the
legislature’s economic policy decisions. This is not its problem. To
the contrary: in many contexts, contemporary free speech law defers too much to the economic policy decisions of the political
branches to adequately vindicate the democratic and selfexpressive interests that the First Amendment is supposed to
protect. This is true, for example, of the law governing rights of
access to private property.8 One might make a similar argument
about copyright law and the many other areas of law where free
speech interests take a backseat to property interests.9
Contemporary free speech law is instead Lochner-like in how
it conceives of the liberty it protects. Although today Lochner is
remembered most often through the prism of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr’s famous dissent, which argued that the problem with the majority opinion was that it showed insufficient deference to the New York legislature’s determination that a
maximum-hours law was wise economic policy,10 at the time many
critics considered the Lochner Court’s most serious error to have
nothing to do with judicial-deference rules. The problem with the
majority opinion in Lochner, these critics argued, was not its

8

See notes 275–80 and accompanying text.
For arguments that copyright law inadequately protects free speech values, see
generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354 (1999); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand L Rev 1 (1987).
10 Lochner, 198 US at 74–76 (Holmes dissenting).
9
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failure to defer but instead its failure to recognize that, under conditions of pronounced economic inequality, the freedom of workers could be enhanced, not undermined, by legislative restrictions
on what terms and conditions they could contract for. It was its
embrace of “an academic theory of equality in the face of practical
conditions of inequality,” they claimed, that led the Lochner Court
to reach the wrong conclusion.11
A similar criticism can be made about the contemporary First
Amendment. Just as it once did in its freedom of contract cases, in
recent decades the Supreme Court has embraced a highly academic conception of freedom of speech—one that largely fails (and
in some contexts, adamantly refuses) to consider the economic and
social forces that as a practical matter shape the exercise of First
Amendment rights. The result has been the creation of a body of
law that, like Lochner-era substantive due process, insists that
most legislative efforts to protect the expressive freedom of the
less powerful by limiting the expressive freedom of the more powerful are constitutionally impermissible. It is this feature of contemporary First Amendment doctrine, this Article argues, that
makes it Lochner-like. More to the point—it is this feature of
contemporary First Amendment doctrine that has made it, like
Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine, a powerful sword for reinforcing the power of the propertied and a shield against government efforts at redistribution.
If scholars wish to critique the doctrine for its Lochnerian
tendencies, it is this they should critique. By instead focusing on
the decision to extend constitutional protection to commercial and
corporate speech, critics avoid having to tackle the hard questions
raised by the Lochner analogy: namely, what a First Amendment
jurisprudence organized around a less academic conception of expressive freedom would look like. They also unduly limit the scope
of their critique by suggesting that the First Amendment’s
Lochner problems are either confined to the commercial and corporate speech cases, or extend only to other cases involving commercially oriented speech. If we understand the true lesson of
Lochner to be that constitutional rights cannot effectively be enforced without taking account of the economic, political, and social
conditions that impact their exercise—as indeed, we should—
then the First Amendment’s Lochner problems cannot be so easily
contained.
11

Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L J 454, 454 (1909).
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This Article thus reconceives the Lochner analogy in an effort
to think more creatively about how to solve it. The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how the analogy to Lochner
has been used to criticize both the Burger Court’s decision to apply heightened scrutiny to laws regulating commercial advertising and corporate speech, as well as the increasingly strict scrutiny the Court has applied in such cases in recent years.
Part II explains why the claim that the Court’s commercial
and corporate speech cases resurrect Lochner by extending protection to speech that lacks constitutional value is wrong. Even if
we leave aside the complex question of whether and to what extent the First Amendment protects individual expressive autonomy, protection of commercial advertising and at least some kinds
of corporate speech can be justified by the First Amendment’s core
interest in preserving a robust and diverse marketplace of ideas.
This means that the extension of constitutional protection to commercial advertising and to corporate speech does not represent,
as critics allege, a break from the principles that guided First
Amendment jurisprudence up until the 1970s. Instead, it represents the logical extension of those principles.
Part III argues that the real source of the similarities between contemporary free speech law and Lochner-era freedom of
contract jurisprudence is that both construe the constitutional
right they vindicate as a strong but limited negative autonomy
right: as a right that guarantees freedom from intentional government interference with an individual’s autonomy, but one that
provides almost no protection whatsoever against private interference and constraint.12 It was this feature of Lochner-era jurisprudence that produced a body of law that was insensitive to

12 By “negative right,” I mean a right that guarantees negative liberty—that is, freedom from interference by others. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty 6–7 (Oxford
1958). When I use the term “positive right,” I mean a right that guarantees positive liberty,
which we might define broadly as “not freedom from, but freedom to.” Id at 16–19. See also
Steven J. Heyman, Positive and Negative Liberty, 68 Chi Kent L Rev 81, 81 (1992) (“In
broad terms, negative liberty means freedom from—from interference, coercion, or restraint—while positive liberty means freedom to, or self-determination—freedom to act or
to be as one wills.”) (emphasis in original). The distinction between positive and negative
freedom has been the subject of considerable criticism. Theorists have argued that it is
incoherent to speak of negative freedom because the mere absence of government coercion
cannot, on its own, guarantee individual freedom, given the numerous other sources of
constraint that exist. See, for example, T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political
Obligation and Other Writings 200–01 (Cambridge 1986) (Paul Harris and John Morrow,
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questions of economic inequality and hostile, as a result, to
worker-protective economic regulation like the bakery law struck
down in Lochner. And it is because courts today rely upon a similarly strong but similarly limited conception of the right to freedom of speech that they interpret the First Amendment to protect
the right of property owners to control the expressive uses to
which their property gets put, but to provide very little protection
to listeners, or to those who lack property that they can use to
participate in public debate. The strongly anti-redistributive cast
of contemporary free speech law is not, in other words, primarily
a consequence of how broadly the First Amendment applies. It is
instead the consequence of what courts today understand freedom
of speech to mean and to require.
As Part III also shows, however, courts have not always conceived of freedom of speech in as limited a fashion as they do today. During both the New Deal and Warren Court eras, the Court
employed a more capacious view of freedom of speech: one that
understood it as a positive, not a negative, right. Indeed, the
Court conceived the First Amendment to guarantee individuals
perhaps the most important positive right they could possess in a
democratic society: namely, the right to participate in the formation of democratic public opinion, and in the democratic political process more broadly. The New Deal and Warren Courts did
not always do a terribly good job enforcing this positive right, but
they understood that this is what freedom of speech had to mean
if the First Amendment was to play its “historic” role as a guardian of American democracy.13 It was only in the 1970s that a majority of the Court began to interpret freedom of speech as the
conservative minority on the New Deal Court had once argued it
should be interpreted: as a negative right—that is, as a right that
guarantees noninterference from the state but little more. This
shift in the Court’s understanding of freedom of speech produced

eds). This may be true. It nevertheless remains the case that the idea—that what constitutional rights guarantee is freedom from government coercion and little more—has
played a tremendously important role in American constitutional jurisprudence and practice. When I use the terms positive and negative rights, I use them therefore to describe
competing conceptions of the nature of constitutional rights and freedoms, not to make
claims about the possibility of a purely negative freedom.
13 See Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88, 102–03 (1940) (“Freedom of discussion, if it
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period” and to make “effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern [ ] society.”).
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a body of law that was remarkably reminiscent, in both doctrinal
structure and political economic effects, to Lochner-era due process jurisprudence. Critics are therefore correct when they trace
the Lochnerization of the First Amendment to changes in free
speech doctrine instituted by the Burger Court. They are simply
incorrect in what they identify as the nature of that change.14
Part IV concludes by sketching out the normative implications of this history. As it demonstrates, the debate over the nature of the First Amendment’s Lochner problem is not an academic one by any means. Different views of the First
Amendment’s Lochner problem lead to different conclusions
about how it should be fixed. If the problem is that the First
Amendment has gotten too big or too strong, the obvious solution
is to narrow its scope and weaken the strength of its protections.
But if the problem is instead the almost entirely negative conception of freedom of speech that underpins contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence, then the solution cannot be to simply
limit the class of cases in which the First Amendment protection
applies or to weaken the protections afforded to advertising and
other kinds of commercial speech. The solution must be to reimagine freedom of speech as a positive right, and as a right that consequently protects individuals against both public and private
power. This is, obviously, no easy task to accomplish. But it is the
only satisfactory solution to the ills that beset contemporary free
speech law.
I. LOCHNER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
There are few opinions in Supreme Court history that are
more widely disliked than the Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner.
Indeed, to claim that an opinion is like Lochner, or that it performs the same move as the Lochner Court (in contemporary

14 In arguing that the Lochner-like features of contemporary free speech are a product of how courts understand the right to freedom of speech, not how they conceive its
boundaries, this Article echoes the argument that Professor Cass Sunstein made in his
wonderful 1987 article, Lochner’s Legacy. Like Sunstein’s article, this Article argues
against the interpretation of the Lochner Court’s errors that Justice Holmes articulated
in his famous dissent. See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 905–06 (cited in note 5). Like
Sunstein’s article, it suggests instead that the problem with the Lochner Court—and with
contemporary free speech law—is the similar conception of constitutional liberty that both
employ. See id at 882–83. Unlike Sunstein’s article, however, it does not assume that the
Lochnerian features of contemporary constitutional law are a permanent, even inevitable
feature of the constitutional landscape. See id at 903. This Article would not have been
possible without Sunstein’s pathbreaking earlier work.
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lingo, that it “Lochnerizes”), is usually one of the most damning
things one can say about it.15 This is because Lochner is one of a
handful of cases that make up the anticanon of constitutional law.
Anticanonical decisions, like Lochner, Dred Scott v Sandford,16
and Plessy v Ferguson,17 “map out the land mines of the American
constitutional order, and thereby help to constitute that order.”18
They instruct courts on what not to do when interpreting the
Constitution.
To call an opinion or rule of decision Lochnerian is thus to
accuse it of committing a fundamental jurisprudential error.
What fundamental jurisprudential error that a court accused of
Lochnerism is supposed to have made is not always self-evident,
however. This is because Lochner has been accused of multiple
sins, each of which can serve as the basis for the analogy.19
In Lochner, a 5–4 majority of the Court held that a New York
law that prohibited workers in bakeries from working more than
sixty hours a week violated the freedom of contract guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it interfered with the ability of employers and employees to determine for themselves the terms of their contractual relationships.20
In concluding as much, the majority acknowledged that the government could limit freedom of contract in order to promote “the
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public,” but dismissed the possibility that the New York law advanced any of
these goals.21 “[T]he trade of [the] baker,” Justice Rufus Peckham
wrote in his majority opinion, “is not an unhealthy one to that
degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the
. . . right of free contract.”22 Nor, the Court held, do tired workers
pose a sufficient threat to public safety to justify the law on those

15 See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U Chi L Rev 373, 373–74
(2003) (“Lochner v New York would probably win the prize, if there were one, for the most
widely reviled decision of the last hundred years.”); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 40 (Belknap 1991) (“For a modern judge, one of the worst insults is that she is
reenacting the sin originally committed by the pre–New Deal Court in cases like Lochner
v. New York.”).
16 60 US 393 (1857).
17 163 US 537 (1896).
18 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv L Rev 379, 380–81 (2011).
19 Strauss, 70 U Chi L Rev at 374 (cited in note 15) (“The striking thing about the
disapproval of Lochner . . . is that there is no consensus on why it is wrong.”).
20 198 US at 57–60.
21 Id at 53, 57.
22 Id at 59.
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grounds.23 The majority also dismissed the possibility that the law
was necessary to protect workers against exploitation. Bakers,
Justice Peckham noted, were “as a class . . . equal in intelligence
and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations.” They
were therefore entitled “to assert their rights . . . without the protecting arm of the State interfering with their independence of
judgment and of action” by limiting the number of hours they
could agree to work.24
In its unequivocal rejection of the possibility that the New
York labor law could be justified on health or safety grounds, or
as a means of protecting workers against exploitation, the decision powerfully demonstrates the early twentieth-century Court’s
hostility toward what Justice Peckham described in his opinion
as the increasing and “meddlesome . . . interference on the part of
the legislatures of the several states with the ordinary trades and
occupations of the people.”25 It reflects, in other words, the unease
that at least some members of the federal judiciary felt toward
the efforts by Progressive reformers to regulate the increasingly
industrialized economy much more intensively than it had previously been regulated, in an effort to protect workers against the
new physical and economic harms they faced at work.
The doctrinal distinctions that Justice Peckham’s opinion relied upon, however, and the conception of state power that it advanced were not new. Instead, they had deep roots in American
constitutional law. As Professor Howard Gillman notes:
[T]he essential elements of the Lochner Court’s approach to
the bakery law—the emphasis on market liberty, the belief
that market liberty could be interfered with if legislation promoted a valid public purpose, and the suggestion that valid
public-purpose legislation was distinct from laws that merely

23

Lochner, 198 US at 62:

In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the connection between the
number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful quality of
the bread made by the workman. The connection, if any exists, is too shadowy
and thin to build any argument for the interference of the legislature.
24
25

Id at 57.
Id at 61, 63.
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promoted the interests of some classes at the expense of others—were long-standing features of nineteenth-century police powers jurisprudence.26
Lochner was not, in other words, a doctrinally innovative decision.27 It simply applied what were at the time well-established
legal principles to a new factual situation, albeit in a way that
was undoubtedly sympathetic to business interests.28
The decision was nevertheless widely criticized, both at the
time and in the years to follow. Critics refused to believe that the
Constitution prevented the government from protecting workers
rendered newly vulnerable by the increasing concentration of
wealth and power in the early twentieth-century economy.29 And
yet Lochner suggested that not only was the New York law unconstitutional, but so too was any labor law that could not be justified by the special characteristics of the class of laborers it protected, or the unusual dangerousness of the industry in which
they labored.30
26 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era
Police Powers Jurisprudence 20 (Duke 1993). Nor did the decision break new ground in
recognizing the right to contract as one of the personal rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This honor belongs to Allgeyer v Louisiana,
165 US 578 (1897), which the Court handed down eight years before Lochner. See Thomas
B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 Cornell L Rev 527, 534 (2015).
27 Prior to Lochner, the Court had not ruled on the constitutionality of the maximumhour laws that were springing up throughout the country, and the Court’s instruction on
the topic was eagerly anticipated. Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 125–26 (cited in
note 26). In this respect, Lochner was an important decision. But it was not a decision that
generated significant doctrinal change. Id at 147–48 (noting that the dissents “triggered
a minor adjustment in the way the Court went about elaborating the long-standing distinction between valid public-purpose legislation and invalid class legislation” in that afterward “the Court became more willing to attend to ‘expert’ social science data [regarding]
the existence of unhealthful or unsafe working conditions,” but that “while this adjustment
led the judiciary to accept some innovative forms of social legislation, it did not lead judges
to abandon their allegiance to [Lochnerian police-powers] jurisprudence”).
28 Owen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888–1910 163 (Macmillan 1993) (“[In striking down the New
York law, Justice] Peckham did not . . . ‘find’ liberty of contract in the interstices of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He instead was trying to preserve the then fairly well recognized
limits on the police power as a form of constitutive authority.”). See also Greene, 125 Harv
L Rev at 384 (cited in note 18) (noting that one characteristic of anticanonical decisions
like Lochner is that “traditional modes of legal analysis arguably support the[ir] results”
and that “these cases are, in some formalistic sense, correct”).
29 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 NYU L Rev 1383, 1402–28 (2001).
30 In recent years, defenders of the Lochner Court, most notably Professor David
Bernstein, have argued that the bakery law it invalidated was not “a meager but
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Critics therefore provided various, sometimes conflicting, arguments for why Lochner was wrong. Some argued that the decision was wrong because it erroneously interpreted the Due
Process Clause to protect a kind of freedom (freedom of contract)
that had very shallow roots in the common law.31 In subsequent
decades, this turned into the now more familiar claim that the
Lochner Court erred by reading into the Constitution an unenumerated right.32 Others argued that the decision was wrong because it failed to take sufficient account of the economic realities
of the modern workplace, and more specifically, the inequality in
bargaining power that employers and employees possessed in the
early twentieth-century economy.33

hard-fought legislative victory” for “overworked, exploited bakery workers” but instead a
mechanism the powerful New York bakers’ union employed “to drive small bakeshops that
employed recent immigrants out of the industry.” David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform 23 (Chicago 2011). Antiimmigrant and anticompetitive sentiments may certainly have played a role in generating
support for the law. There is no question, however, that the bakery law struck down in
Lochner was part of a broader struggle by unions across the country and in all sectors of
industry to limit working hours and guarantee better conditions for labor. See Howard
Schweber, Lochner v. New York and the Challenge of Legal Historiography, 39 L & Soc
Inq 242, 258–59 (2014) (citation omitted):
The call for limitations on working hours was neither novel nor radical in 1905.
Bakers in New York had gone on strike in 1881 demanding a twelve-hour day.
New York passed eight-hour-day laws in 1867, 1870, and 1886, the last of which
finally contained enforcement mechanisms. Nationally, a call for a law limiting
the working day to eight hours was central to the creation of the first national
labor organizations in the 1860s and remained a critical organizing issue for
labor well into the 1930s.
The decision in Lochner came to be reviled, therefore, not so much because its critics necessarily believed that the law it struck down was so valuable but because of what it intimated about the fate of the union struggle in general. See William E. Forbath, Law and
the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 42 n 28, 52–53 (Harvard 1991). And in this
respect, critics of the decision were correct to be concerned. As Professor William Forbath
has chronicled in detail, during this period, employers routinely used the tool of constitutional litigation to strike down worker-protective wage and hour legislation on due process
grounds. Id at 37–97.
31 Friedman, 76 NYU L Rev at 1413–14 (cited in note 29) (noting that critics “regularly referred to the supposed liberty of contract” recognized by the Lochner Court
“as ‘new’ or ‘novel’” and criticized the Court for recognizing a right “without historical
precedent”).
32 See, for example, West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 391 (1937) (“What is
this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”); Strauss, 70 U Chi
L Rev at 378–81 (cited in note 15).
33 Colby and Smith, 100 Cornell L Rev at 537–38 (cited in note 26):
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Others, meanwhile, argued that the decision was wrong because it showed insufficient deference to the New York legislature’s view that the bakery law was wise economic policy. This
was the argument that Justice Holmes made in his now-famous
dissent.34 Because the Constitution is “made for people of fundamentally differing views,” Justice Holmes asserted, judges should
respect “the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law”
and overturn statutes only if “a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of
our people and our law.”35 The majority therefore erred, Justice
Holmes argued, when it struck down the New York law because
it did not violate (at least on his view) fundamental principles of
American law as reasonable men would understand them.36
In subsequent years, critics seized on all of these accounts of
the Lochner Court’s errors as the basis for charges of Lochnerism.
Critics argued that decisions in which the Court recognized a due
process right to contraception and abortion replicated the Lochner
Court’s sins by reading unenumerated rights into the Constitution.37 In other cases, critics argued that judges resurrected
Lochner by failing to adequately take account of economic realities, such as the inequality in bargaining power that characterized the relationship between employers and employees.38
When it came to the free speech cases, however, what critics
usually meant when they accused the Court of Lochnerism was
not that it illegitimately sought to vindicate unenumerated
rights, employed overly vague rules of decision, or failed to take
To many observers [in the early twentieth century], the Court was either unconscionably oblivious or viciously hostile to the realities of the sweatshop-era workplace and to the underlying premise of the entire labor movement: that inequalities in bargaining power between management and labor can, in the absence of
regulation, lead to egregious exploitation of the working class.
34

Lochner, 198 US at 74–76 (Holmes dissenting).
Id at 75–76.
36 Id at 76. In insisting that courts should only invalidate democratically enacted
laws when they were patently unreasonable, Justice Holmes echoed the argument made
by Professor James Bradley Thayer in his important 1893 article, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129 (1893).
37 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
L J 920, 939 (1973).
38 See, for example, Korte v Sebelius, 735 F3d 654, 720–22 (7th Cir 2013) (Rovner
dissenting) (“One flaw of the Lochner jurisprudence is that while the Court purported to
protect the constitutional rights of workers as well as employers, it blinded itself to the
reality that employees frequently did not possess bargaining power enabling them to pursue and protect their own liberty interests.”).
35
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adequate account of economic inequality. What they meant instead was that the Court failed to show adequate deference to the
policy judgments of democratically elected legislatures.
A. The First Wave of First Amendment Lochner Critiques
Critics began to make arguments of this sort very soon after
the Court first began to interpret the First Amendment as a powerful instrument of countermajoritarian protection during the
New Deal period. As early as 1941—only ten years after the
Court, for the first time in its history, struck down a state law on
free speech grounds39—Professor Walton Hamilton and George
Braden claimed in an article in the Yale Law Journal that the
Court’s free speech jurisprudence was doing what liberty of contract once did: illegitimately transferring to judges power that
properly belonged to the democratically elected branches of government.40 Similar arguments would be made repeatedly over the
next seventy years, even if the specific details of the Lochner
analogy shifted over time.
Initially, critics argued, à la Justice Holmes, that the only
way the Court could prevent its First Amendment jurisprudence
from playing the same undemocratic role in American political
life that its Due Process Clause jurisprudence once had was by
interpreting the Speech Clause very narrowly, to prohibit only the
most egregious and unreasonable infringements on expressive
freedom. This is what Hamilton and Braden argued: in allowing
courts to strike down laws that “men not devoid of reason” could
believe did not infringe upon “the traditional freedom of the individual,” the Court’s free speech decisions granted judges, they
claimed, too much discretion to interfere with the policy decisions
of the political branches.41
Justice Felix Frankfurter, a great fan of Justice Holmes’s
Lochner dissent, similarly argued in his dissent in West Virginia
State Board of Education v Barnette42 that the Court should only
strike laws down on First Amendment grounds when there was

39

Stromberg v California, 283 US 359, 369–70 (1931).
Walton H. Hamilton and George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 Yale L J 1319, 1349 (1941) (“A few years ago a bench headed by the present Chief Justice read ‘liberty of contract’ out of the due process clause and promptly read
freedom of speech into its place.”).
41 Id at 1352.
42 319 US 624 (1943).
40
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no basis for believing that “legislators could in reason have enacted [them].”43 Any broader conception of the scope of constitutional review, Justice Frankfurter insisted, would enable the “arbitrary exercise of [judicial] authority.”44 It would commit the
same jurisprudential error as Lochner had, by allowing judges
to override the wishes of the democratic majority whenever they
desired.
Justice Frankfurter and Hamilton and Braden were not
alone in construing the lesson of Lochner to be the danger of empowering courts to perform anything other than the most limited
form of constitutional review. Other important Progressives—including such well-respected figures as Judge Learned Hand—also
argued that the only kind of judicial review appropriate in a pluralist democracy like the United States was the very deferential
rationality review that Justice Holmes advocated in his Lochner
dissent.45
This was not the view that the New Deal Court adopted, however, when it finally broke from the police-powers jurisprudence
that characterized the Lochner era. Although the Court turned
away from Lochner by altering the deference rules that applied in
constitutional cases, rather than by altering other features of its
constitutional doctrine (as some suggested),46 the deference regime it created did not go as far as Justice Holmes’s Lochner dissent suggested it should. In United States v Carolene Products
Co,47 the Court held that in cases involving “regulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions,” courts should adopt
a Holmesian deference rule, or something close to it.48 However,

43

Id at 647 (Frankfurter dissenting).
Id at 648.
45 See Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1958
51–52 (Harvard 3d ed 1960).
46 See, for example, Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv L Rev 489, 513 (1912) (arguing that, rather than deferring to the legislature, courts should interpret the meaning of constitutional rights and duties by looking at
“the social facts upon which law . . . is to be applied”).
47 304 US 144 (1938).
48 Id at 152:
44

[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that
it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators.
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when laws appeared “on [their] face” to violate an enumerated
constitutional right or to “restrict[ ] those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” or to affect “discrete and insular minorities,” the
Court suggested that courts should not simply defer to the legislative judgment so long as it could be made to seem reasonable;
instead, they should apply “more exacting [ ] scrutiny” of legislative ends and means.49 In subsequent cases, it adopted this suggestion as settled law.50
Rather than adopting the single, very deferential standard of
review that Justice Holmes advocated for in his Lochner dissent,
the New Deal Court fashioned a two-tiered or “bifurcated” system
“of constitutional review in which judges would defer to legislative regulation of the economy but scrutinize legislative regulation of noneconomic rights, including the right to free speech.”51 It
did so because a majority of its members had come to believe—
just as Justice Holmes himself had—that although judicial enforcement of economic rights like the right to contract undermined the vibrant pluralist democracy the Constitution was intended to create, judicial enforcement of civil rights such as the
right to freedom of speech enhanced it, by preventing the majority
from being able to use its control of the government apparatus to
undermine the representativeness of the political system writ
large.52
Although the bifurcated system of review was initially quite
controversial, the idea that courts should vigorously enforce free
As Professor Jack Balkin notes, this language suggests that courts should “not strike down
the legislation unless the [c]ourt cannot invent a scenario in which a rational legislature
might have produced the bill before it.” J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw U L Rev 275,
290 (1989).
49 Carolene Products, 304 US at 152–53 n 4.
50 See, for example, Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942); American Federation of Labor v Swing, 312 US 321, 325 (1941); Schneider v State, 308 US 147, 161 (1939).
51 G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 Mich L Rev 299, 309 (1996).
52 Id at 334 (noting that the Court justified granting special protection to speech
rights because of “their indispensable connection to the maintenance of democratic principles”); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713, 715 (1985):
[The Court’s decision in] Carolene promises relief from the problem of legitimacy
raised whenever nine elderly lawyers invalidate the legislative decisions of a
majority of our elected representatives. The Carolene solution is to seize the high
ground of democratic theory and establish that the challenged legislation was
produced by a profoundly defective process. By demonstrating that the legislative decision itself resulted from an undemocratic procedure, a Carolene court
hopes to reverse the spin of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
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speech and other civil rights but not the economic rights that were
of such concern to courts during the Lochner era soon became
widely accepted.53 The result was that, after Justice Frankfurter
retired in 1962, the argument that the Court acted illegitimately
when it struck down speech regulations that were not patently
unreasonable almost entirely disappeared, from both the cases
and the law reviews.
B. The Second Wave of Lochner Criticisms
The widespread acceptance that the bifurcated system of review had achieved by the 1960s did not mean that claims of First
Amendment Lochnerism entirely disappeared, however. Critics
continued to compare the contemporary free speech cases to
Lochner-era freedom of contract cases, just as Hamilton and
Braden did. But the analogy they drew was a different one.
Rather than arguing that the Court repeated the errors of the
Lochner Court when it struck down speech regulations that reasonable men might find reasonable, critics now made a more nuanced claim: namely, that the Court resurrected Lochner when it
interpreted the First Amendment to strike down laws that did not
threaten the vitality of the democratic system, or any other social
good that courts were authorized to protect under the terms of
what was coming to be known as the New Deal settlement.54
Justice Hugo Black was perhaps the first prominent jurist to
make this argument. He did so in his dissenting opinion in Tinker
v Des Moines Independent Community School District55 in 1969.56
The case involved a free speech challenge brought by students
who were suspended from school after they wore black armbands
to protest the Vietnam War.57 The majority held that the suspensions violated the students’ free speech rights because the First

53 As Professor David Strauss notes, although, since the mid-1950s, “many justices
have sat on the Court . . . with different methodological and political commitments,” what
has united all these justices is their “rejection of the Thayer[ian] view” of the judicial function. Strauss, 70 U Chi L Rev at 377 (cited in note 15). The result has been that “[t]he
Court has not limited itself to measures that no rational person could defend; it has consistently asserted a much more prominent role for itself.” Id. Nor did even the Court’s
conservative critics advocate a Thayerian approach. See Colby and Smith, 100 Cornell L
Rev at 566 (cited in note 26).
54 See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term Foreword: We
the Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4, 14 (2001).
55 393 US 503 (1969).
56 Id at 525–26 (Black dissenting).
57 Id at 504 (majority).

1258

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1241

Amendment allowed school officials to penalize students for their
on-campus speech only when it threatened to substantially disrupt school activities or intrude upon the rights of others.58 This
rule was necessary, the Court argued, to ensure that the nation’s
future leaders learned not only reading and writing at school but
also how to engage in the “robust exchange of ideas” that played
such an important role in American politics, and public life more
broadly.59
Justice Black dissented not because he believed, like Justice
Frankfurter, that heightened scrutiny was almost never appropriate in First Amendment cases. To the contrary: Justice Black
made clear that he believed the First Amendment imposed significant constraints on the government’s power to “regulate or censor the content of speech” in other contexts.60 Justice Black did
not believe, however, that the First Amendment imposed significant constraints on the government’s power to regulate or censor
speech in school.61 This was because he disagreed with the majority about the political importance of student speech. “[S]tudents,”
Justice Black argued, are not “sent to the schools at public expense to broadcast political or any other views to educate and inform the public.”62 They are instead sent to school to learn things
they do not know.63 It should therefore, he argued, be school officials, rather than courts, that determined how much student expression was pedagogically appropriate.64 By applying heightened

58

Id at 511.
Tinker, 393 US at 512–14 (alteration in original and quotation marks and citation
omitted):
59

The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools. . . . The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.
60
61
62
63

Id at 517 (Black dissenting).
Id at 521–22.
Id at 522.
Tinker, 393 US at 522 (Black dissenting):

The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned as worthless
or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of experience and
wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders. It may be that the Nation
has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that “children are to be seen not heard,”
but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send
children to school on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not teach.
64

Id at 524.
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scrutiny where it was not justified by the need to prevent government interference with the democratic political process, Justice
Black warned, the Court threatened to “resurrect[ ] that old
reasonableness-due process test” that “prevailed in Lochner.”65 It
arrogated to the judicial branch power that it was not entitled to,
just as the Lochner Court once had.66
Justice Black’s efforts to analogize Tinker to Lochner proved
unpersuasive. Although it was true that, as a historical matter,
schools were not viewed as important forums for political expression but instead were conceived as places in which children were
taught “good order” and respect for authority, this view had
largely broken down by the 1960s.67 Instead it had come to be
widely accepted that schools should not only teach children writing and reading and math, but also the principles of democratic
citizenship—including, among these, the principle of dissent.68
The result was that no other member of the Court joined Justice
Black’s opinion, and, in subsequent years, few others echoed his
argument about the Lochner-like features of the Court’s studentspeech doctrine.69
This did not mean, however, that others did not share the
concern that Justice Black expressed in his Tinker dissent—
namely, that the Warren and later Burger Courts’ increasingly
expansive free speech jurisprudence threatened to extend the
First Amendment beyond what a democratic rationale could bear.
It simply meant that it was not the Court’s school-speech cases
that emerged as the focus of this concern. Arguments about the
Lochnerization of the First Amendment instead came to focus on
the Court’s commercial and corporate speech cases.

65

Id at 519–20.
Id at 515 (“The Court’s holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely
new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected ‘officials of state supported
public schools . . .’ in the United States is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme
Court.”) (alteration in original).
67 For expression of the older view, see State v Mizner, 45 Iowa 248, 250–51 (1876)
(reversing a lower court ruling barring teachers from using corporal punishment on female
students over eighteen years old on the grounds that such a rule “might destroy the authority of the teacher and be utterly subversive of good order” in the school).
68 See Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court,
and the Battle for the American Mind 78–79 (Pantheon 2018) (noting Tinker’s overwhelmingly positive public reaction).
69 Of the contemporary members of the Court, only Justice Clarence Thomas has
followed Justice Black in suggesting any connection between the student-speech cases and
Lochner. See Morse v Frederick, 551 US 393, 420–21 (2007) (Thomas concurring).
66
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In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc70 in 1976, a 7–1 majority of the Court held that
“purely commercial advertising”—which it defined as speech that
“does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’”—was entitled to First Amendment protection, and that the state of
Virginia could not therefore constitutionally prohibit pharmacies
from advertising the prices of their prescription drugs.71 The holding represented a major doctrinal shift. Three decades earlier, in
Valentine v Chrestensen,72 the Court had held—in a unanimous,
albeit extremely brief, opinion—that the First Amendment constraints that applied when the government regulated other kinds
of speech did not apply when the government regulated purely
commercial advertising.73 Over the next three decades, the Court
defined the category of purely commercial advertising increasingly narrowly, but continued to assume that speech of this sort
lay beyond the scope of First Amendment concern.74
In explicitly overturning Valentine, Virginia Pharmacy unsettled over thirty years of precedent. It also suggested that, from
here on out, legislatures would possess significantly less power
than they had thus far to regulate what was, by the 1970s, an
important segment of the market economy. The opinion was careful to note that the Court’s holding did not mean that legislatures
would not be able to regulate commercial advertising at all. In his
majority opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun made clear, for example, that legislatures would still be able to prohibit false as well
as misleading advertising, and suggested that they would also be
able to require advertisements to “appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as
are necessary to prevent [their] being deceptive.”75 He strongly
suggested, however, that legislatures would no longer be able to
enact what he called “paternalistic” advertising laws—laws that

70

425 US 748 (1976).
Id at 755, 762, 770. Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the case.
72 316 US 52 (1942).
73 Id at 54.
74 See, for example, Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809, 822 (1975) (concluding that the
First Amendment applied to abortion ads because the ads “contained factual material of
clear ‘public interest’”); New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 256–57, 266 (1964)
(concluding that the First Amendment applied to an ad paid for by supporters of the civil
rights movement that “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern”).
75 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771 n 24.
71
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prohibited advertising because the legislature feared that consumers would use the information it conveyed in harmful ways.76
The opinion also unequivocally held that legislatures would no
longer be able to totally ban the advertising of lawful goods or
services.77
The reaction was strong and immediate. Although some commentators celebrated the decision, others sharply criticized it for
excessively constraining the power of the democratic legislature.
Many of those who made the latter argument invoked Lochner to
do so. In an influential law review article published three years
after the decision was handed down, Professors Thomas Jackson
and John Calvin Jeffries Jr argued, for example, that the decision
in Virginia Pharmacy “reconstituted the values of Lochner v. New
York as components of freedom of speech.”78 Professor Edwin
Baker similarly argued that the extension of constitutional protection to advertising augured a return to the Lochner era.79 And
in a dissent he wrote four years after Virginia Pharmacy was
handed down, Justice William Rehnquist—the only member of
the Court to have dissented from the original opinion—argued
that, by extending significant constitutional protection to commercial advertising, the Court
return[ed constitutional law] to the bygone era of Lochner v.
New York, . . . in which it was common practice for this Court
to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based
on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for
the State to implement its considered policies.80
What these critics meant when they accused Virginia Pharmacy of returning constitutional law to the Lochner era was not
that the decision literally introduced into First Amendment law
the doctrinal distinctions that led the Lochner Court to overturn
76 Id at 769–70 (arguing that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures like
Virginia’s from “keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering” in their misguided efforts to prevent the public from misusing that information).
77 Id at 773 (“What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that
information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions,
we conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.”) (citation omitted).
78 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 30–31 (citation omitted) (cited in note 3).
79 C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa
L Rev 1, 2 n 5 (1976).
80 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York,
447 US 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist dissenting).
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the New York bakery law. What they meant was instead the same
thing that Justice Black meant when he accused the Tinker Court
of Lochnerism: namely, that the decision illegitimately aggrandized judicial power by preventing the democratic legislature
from being able to regulate even democratically unimportant
speech.
Commercial advertising is democratically unimportant, they
argued, because it has nothing to say about the political realm.
As Jackson and Jeffries noted: “The typical newspaper advertisement or television commercial makes no comment on governmental personnel or policy. It does not marshal information relevant
to political action, nor does it focus public attention on questions
of political significance.”81 This meant, critics insisted, that
the democratic arguments the Court had relied on for four
decades at that point to justify heightened scrutiny of protected
speech did not justify extending the same heightened scrutiny to
commercial ads.82
Nor, critics argued, does constitutionalizing the regulation of
commercial advertising protect any other important First Amendment interest—in particular, its interest in safeguarding from
state control a sphere of individual expressive autonomy. Since
the early twentieth century, the Court had recognized that the
First Amendment protects not only the robust political debate
necessary to ensure a healthy system of democratic government,
but also the individual right “to think as you will and to speak as
you think”—and that it does so both as a means of vindicating
democratic principles and as an end in itself.83
81

Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 15 (cited in note 3).
See id (arguing that because commercial advertising concerns only “economic rather than political decisionmaking,” the “structure of representative democracy yields no
inference of [its] inviolability”); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 787–88 (Rehnquist dissenting) (citation omitted):
82

The Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with the view that
the First Amendment is “primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision
making in a democracy.” I had understood this view to relate to public decision
making as to political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision
of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of
shampoo.
83 Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis concurring). See also
Barnette, 319 US at 642 (concluding that a compulsory flag-salute law was unconstitutional because it “invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control”); Stanley v
Georgia, 394 US 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that
a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch.”).
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Beginning in the 1960s, prominent First Amendment theorists began to argue that the First Amendment’s primary purpose
was to protect individual expressive freedom and that it was a
mistake, as a result, to give any constitutional priority to political,
or even public, speech.84 Critics of the Court’s advertising decisions were not so sure. Jackson and Jeffries, in particular, expressed significant discomfort with this view of the First Amendment, which they warned could be used to create a jurisprudence
that undercut, rather than reinforced, democratic government by
constraining the political branches even when doing so was not
necessary to ensuring that the processes of political representation were working well.85 They noted, for example, that a First
Amendment conceived primarily as an instrument of what
Professor Thomas Emerson called “individual self-fulfillment”
could be used to “disallow[ ] legislative choice on grounds unrelated to the integrity of the political process” and “thus limit[ ] the
power of the [ ] political system that the guarantee of freedom of
speech, at least in part, is designed to nurture.”86
Jackson and Jeffries nevertheless agreed with Emerson,
Baker, and others who held this view that, even if the First
Amendment’s primary goal is to guarantee individual expressive
freedom, Virginia Pharmacy would still be wrongly decided.87
This is because, they claimed, commercial advertising simply is
not a medium that individuals use to find “individual selffulfillment” or to express themselves.88 Instead ads exist for one
purpose and one purpose only: to increase sales for the products

84 See, for example, Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591,
593–94, 604 (1982) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only
one true value, . . . ‘individual self-realization,’” which means that its “appropriate scope
. . . is much broader than [a democracy-focused theory] would have it. . . . There thus is no
logical basis for distinguishing the role speech plays in the political process.”); Thomas I.
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6–7 (Random House 1970) (arguing that
freedom of expression is “[f]irst, . . . essential as a means of assuring individual selffulfillment” and also “essential to provide for participation in decision making by all
members of society . . . [not only in] the political realm . . . [but also] in religion, literature,
art, science, and all areas of human learning and knowledge”); Baker, 62 Iowa L Rev at 8
(cited in note 79) (“As a manifestation of the self, speech deserves protection even if it is
not used to communicate with others.”).
85 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 13 n 46 (cited in note 3). This meant, they
argued, that the Emersonian view of the First Amendment as a safeguard of expressive
freedom existed in only “ironic relationship” to the traditional view of the First Amendment as a safeguard of democratic government. Id.
86 Id.
87 Id at 14–15.
88 Id at 14.
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they advertise.89 As a result, Jackson and Jeffries argued, the only
interests advanced by applying heightened scrutiny to the regulation of advertisements are the kinds of economic liberty interests the Lochner Court protected in its freedom of contract cases.
It was this that led them to conclude that Virginia Pharmacy “reconstituted the values of Lochner v. New York as components of
freedom of speech.”90
Critics made similar arguments around the same time about
another line of cases in which the Court applied heightened scrutiny to laws that regulate the nonadvertising speech of corporations, as well as corporate spending on political speech. Although
prior to the 1970s the Court had frequently extended constitutional protection to media corporations and had also made clear
that nonprofit corporations could possess First Amendment
rights, it had never squarely ruled on whether for-profit, nonmedia corporations (or what it referred to simply as “business corporations”) were protected by the Speech Clause.91 This changed in
1978, when in First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti,92 the Court
held that a state law that prohibited corporations from spending
money to influence the vote on popular referenda that did not
“materially affect[ ] any of the[ir] property, business or assets”
violated the First Amendment by restricting, without sufficient
justification, the speech of business corporations.93

89 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 14 (cited in note 3) (“[T]he concept of a [F]irst
[A]mendment right of personal autonomy in matters of belief and expression stops short
of a seller hawking his wares.”); Baker, 62 Iowa L Rev at 3 (cited in note 79):

[I]n our present historical setting, commercial speech is not a manifestation of
individual freedom or choice; unlike the broad categories of protected speech,
commercial speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in
a way which can be expected to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes.
See also Emerson, Freedom of Expression at 311 (cited in note 84) (asserting that advertising, like “soliciting, canvassing, [and] similar conduct that is wholly ‘commercial’ in nature . . . fall[s] within the system of commercial enterprise and . . . outside the system of
freedom of expression”).
90 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 30–31 (citation omitted) (cited in note 3).
91 Pre–Virginia Pharmacy cases involving the First Amendment rights of media corporations include Red Lion Broadcasting Co v Federal Communications Commission, 395
US 367 (1969); Sullivan, 376 US 254; Joseph Burstyn, Inc v Wilson, 343 US 495 (1952);
and Grosjean v American Press Co, 297 US 233, 244 (1936). The Court recognized the
First Amendment rights of a nonprofit corporation (the NAACP) in National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415, 428–29 (1963). For use of
the term “business corporation,” see First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765,
767 (1978).
92 435 US 765 (1978).
93 Id at 767–68, 776.
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Although the Court refused to hold that the First Amendment rights of corporate persons were identical to those of natural
persons, it adamantly rejected the idea that the only corporations
that possessed a constitutionally protected right to speak were
media companies or advocacy organizations. “[T]he press does not
have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to
enlighten,” Justice Lewis Powell noted for the majority.94 “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.”95 Two years later,
in Consolidated Edison Co of New York v Public Service Commission of New York,96 the Court again struck down a law that regulated noncommercial corporate speech—in this case, an order by
a state agency that prohibited a privately owned public utility
from including inserts expressing “[its] opinions or viewpoints on
controversial issues of public policy” in the billing envelopes it
sent to customers each month.97
Critics argued that, like the advertising cases, these cases augured a “return to the Lochner era of economic due process” by
extending protection to speech that furthered primarily economic
freedom, rather than the democratic or expressive freedom the
First Amendment was supposed to protect.98 In making this argument, they acknowledged that the nonadvertising speech of
corporations was not necessarily irrelevant to political decisionmaking. To the contrary: the speech at issue in Bellotti and
Pacific Gas & Electric Co v Public Utilities Commission of
California99 was obviously politically relevant, and designed to
be.100 Nevertheless, critics argued, regulations of even politically
94

Id at 782.
Id at 777.
96 447 US 530 (1980).
97 Id at 533.
98 C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 646, 653 n 25 (1982); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 Yale L J
1833, 1834 (1981) (“[B]y reaffirming and extending the entitlement of corporations to constitutional rights, the Court in Bellotti rendered a decision strongly reminiscent of the
economic due process era, one marking an important departure from post–New Deal constitutional jurisprudence to date.”).
99 475 US 1 (1986).
100 The corporation that challenged the law in Bellotti wished to spend money to influence the vote on a ballot question about a proposed state constitutional amendment
that would have permitted the legislature to introduce a graduated income tax. Bellotti,
435 US at 769. In Pacific Gas, the corporation wished to continue to include in its billing
95
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relevant corporate speech do not pose the same threat to the
vitality of democratic public debate that regulations of noncorporate speech do. This is because, even when the government totally
bans corporations from speaking, the natural persons who
comprise the corporation remain perfectly free to make the
corporation’s arguments themselves.101 Accordingly, restrictions
on corporate speech “impinge[ ] much less severely upon the
availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions
upon individual speech.”102
Nor, critics claimed, do regulations of corporate speech impede the ability of individuals to “use [ ] communication as a
means of self-expression, self-realization, [or] self-fulfillment.”103
This is because, even when it does not take the form of commercial advertising, corporate speech reflects the economic imperatives of the corporate entity that pays for it, rather than the values or beliefs of the individuals who compose it.104 As a result, the
primary interest advanced by the constitutionalization of corporate speech is not democracy or self-expression but corporate economic liberty—and this is not an interest the First Amendment
cares anything about.
Although the details of the arguments differed, the conclusion that critics reached about the corporate speech cases—
namely, that they represented “an important departure from
post–New Deal constitutional jurisprudence” and a return to a
Lochnerian vision of the Constitution as a guarantor of economic
liberty—was identical to the conclusion that critics reached about
the advertising cases.105 In both areas of law, critics argued that
the extension of constitutional protection to commercial entities
inserts a magazine it published that “included political editorials [and] feature stories on
matters of public interest” as well as “tips on energy conservation, and straightforward
information about utility services and bills.” Pacific Gas, 475 US at 5.
101 Bellotti, 435 US at 807 (White dissenting) (“Even the complete curtailment of corporate communications concerning political or ideological questions not integral to day-today business functions would leave . . . corporate shareholders, employees, and customers,
free to communicate their thoughts.”); Note, 90 Yale L J at 1856 (cited in note 98) (“[A]llowing legislatures to restrict the use of corporate property would intrude upon the speech
rights of no individuals. Corporate owners and managers would be as free as before to
advocate their political views.”).
102 Bellotti, 435 US at 807 (White dissenting).
103 Id at 804.
104 Baker, 130 U Pa L Rev at 653 (cited in note 98) (“[T]he market mechanism, by
forcing the enterprise to make the most efficient (profit-maximizing) decisions, dictates
the content of the enterprise’s speech, and thus separates the decision concerning speech
content from the value decisions of either the employees or the owners of the enterprise.”).
105 Note, 90 Yale L J at 1834 (cited in note 98).
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and to commercially oriented speech constituted a judicial usurpation of legislative power similar to that enacted by the Lochner
Court.
For a while, these arguments appeared to persuade the Court
to back away from rigorously protecting commercially oriented
speech. Two years after Virginia Pharmacy was handed down, the
Court handed down another commercial advertising decision in
which it asserted that commercial advertising was entitled to only
“a limited measure of [constitutional] protection, commensurate
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”106 Several years later, the Court held in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico107 that, because the Puerto Rican legislature possessed the “greater power”
to ban all gambling in the territory, it also possessed the “lesser
power” to ban all ads about gambling in the territory, even when
it did not choose to ban the gambling itself.108 Given the tremendous power that legislatures otherwise possessed to ban the sale
of certain kinds of goods since the demise of economic due process,
the Court’s lesser-power argument granted legislatures virtually
unlimited power to ban whatever advertising they desired.109 At
the same time, the Court also significantly cut back the protection
afforded corporate speakers by the First Amendment when it
held, in Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,110 that
the special advantages that corporations possessed, by virtue of
state law, justified more extensive regulation of their political
spending than would otherwise be permitted.111
This pullback in the protection afforded commercial advertising and corporate speech did not last forever, however. Beginning
in the early 1990s, the Court began to show renewed solicitude
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Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447, 456 (1978).
478 US 328 (1986).
108 Id at 345–46.
109 See Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: “’Twas
Strange, ’Twas Passing Strange; ’Twas Pitiful, ’Twas Wondrous Pitiful”, 1986 S Ct Rev 1,
12–13 (noting that, if “advertising of any economic activity that was not itself constitutionally protected activity, however legal that activity might be, was properly subject to
government censorship . . . , then, under Posadas, there is no advertising that is not subject to government censorship”). “[T]he protection of commercial speech under the First
Amendment,” Professor Kathleen Sullivan noted ten years later, appeared “[l]eft for dead.”
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44
Liquormart, 1996 S Ct Rev 123, 123.
110 494 US 652 (1990).
111 Id at 658–59.
107
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for the free speech rights of advertisers and for-profit corporations. In 44 Liquormart, Inc v Rhode Island,112 it adamantly rejected the “greater power includes the lesser power” argument
from Posadas.113 It also applied increasingly stringent scrutiny to
the arguments the government used to justify advertising regulations, as well as laws regulating corporate speech and spending.114
The result was a resurgence of arguments along the lines of
those that Baker, Jackson and Jeffries, and Justice Rehnquist
made in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Critics both on and off
the Court asserted, just as critics had decades earlier, that the
new commercial and corporate speech cases signaled a return to
the Lochner era. In 1999, Professor Daniel Greenwood argued, for
example, that the “rapid expansion [of the First Amendment] into
areas long thought impervious to constitutional law”—specifically, areas “of economic regulation we thought the courts had
abandoned to the legislatures after the Lochner disaster”—had
made the Speech Clause “the locus of a new Lochnerism[, ]or rather, a revival of the old Lochnerism under a new doctrinal label.”115 Nine years later, Professor Tamara Piety similarly argued
that the commercial and corporate speech cases reflected “a sort
of latter-day Lochnerism” by extending constitutional protection
to speech that furthers primarily economic rather than expressive
aims.116
This time around, these criticisms utterly failed to persuade
the Court to pull back the level of scrutiny it applied to regulations of commercial and corporate speech. If anything, the Court
ratcheted up the level of protection it applied in commercial and
corporate speech cases. In Citizens United v Federal Election
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517 US 484 (1996).
Id at 510–11.
114 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston L Rev 697, 732 (2003) (“The Court
concluded in the mid-1970s that commercial advertising was constitutionally protected;
seemingly pulled back on that protection in the 1980s; but has been providing more and
more protection since the early 1990s.”) (citations omitted); Richard L. Hasen, Election
Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps
and Surprising Twists, 68 Stan L Rev 1597, 1603 (2016) (“The campaign finance landscape
changed dramatically with the emergence of the Roberts Court, turning a Court that usually voted in favor of campaign limits by a 5–4 vote into one usually voting against such
limits by a 5–4 vote.”).
115 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 Utah L Rev 659,
659–61 (citation omitted).
116 Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 Cardozo L Rev
2583, 2586 (2008).
113
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Commission,117 in 2010, the Court adamantly rejected the idea
that the corporate nature of the speaker should make any difference to the analysis in free speech cases.118 The following year, in
Sorrell v IMS Health Inc,119 it applied exceedingly rigorous scrutiny to a law that regulated the sale of information to pharmaceutical marketers, and ultimately struck the law down.120
Decisions like these have led to continuing criticism of the
Lochnerian tendencies of the contemporary commercial and corporate speech cases. Some of the critics argue—just as Justice
Rehnquist and Jackson and Jeffries once argued—that, in order
to prevent the First Amendment from replicating the sins of the
Lochner Court, advertising and corporate speech should be entirely denied constitutional protection.121 Others accept that some
measure of constitutional protection for commercial and corporate speech is required, but argue that contemporary free speech
law resurrects Lochner by failing to respect the “subordinate
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558 US 310 (2010).
Id at 340–41.
119 564 US 552 (2011).
120 Id at 557, 565–70, 580.
121 See, for example, Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening
the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 Stan L Rev 1389, 1392–93
(2017) (describing the scholarly “consensus” that “the outward creep of the First Amendment” has produced a “neo-Lochner moment” in free speech law); Reza R. Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 SC L Rev 913, 917, 919 (2007):
118

Theorists have too easily tried to elevate commercial speech to the level of political, artistic, or scientific speech at the core of the First Amendment. Commercial
speech, however, is different.
...
At its core, commercial speech is about facilitating a monetary transaction, not
serious political, artistic, or scientific discourse.
See also Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin Labeling and the First Amendment, 70 Food & Drug L J 25, 25 (2015) (arguing that in recent years “[o]bjections having
little to do with free speech at their heart [have been] channeled into First Amendment
challenges,” and that “most commercial speech regulation” is “fundamentally economic
policy”); Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 1119, 1128–
30 (2015) (stating that “[f]or almost two centuries, the First Amendment was considered
largely irrelevant to regulation of speech advancing commercial and professional activities
because such regulation was understood to be directed fundamentally at commerce rather
than at discourse in the public sphere,” and arguing that recent commercial speech cases
err by “conflat[ing] [ ] spending and speaking” and by failing to “make[ ] meaningful distinctions among kinds of speech-related activities”); Coates, 30 Const Commen at 239
(cited in note 6) (arguing that constitutional protection for corporate speech represents a
“radical break with the history and traditions of U.S. law” and is “incompatib[le] . . . with
American political realities”).
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position” that commercially oriented speech possesses in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.122 In all cases, however, the
claim is that the recent cases extend more protection to corporate
and commercial speech than it warrants, and consequently represents a “return[ ] to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York.”123
These arguments have considerable rhetorical force. By invoking Lochner, critics are able to accuse the Court not only of
reaching the wrong result in its commercial and corporate speech
cases but also of employing a mode of constitutional jurisprudence
that has been, in theory at least, almost universally disavowed
for over seventy years. They also highlight the obvious similarities in the effects of Lochner-era due process and contemporary
free speech law—namely, the fact that both doctrines result in
meaningful limits on the legislature’s ability to regulate the
market.
But are they correct? Is it the case that commercial advertising and corporate speech possess, at best, a subordinate status in
the First Amendment hierarchy due to the fact that they further
primarily economic rather than expressive ends? Is it the case, as
a result, that the extension of close-to-full constitutional protection to commercial advertising and to the noncommercial speech
of business corporations represents an unjustified departure—or
what some have described as a “radical break”—from the principles that guided First Amendment jurisprudence up until the
1970s?124
In the next Part, I argue that the answer to these questions
is no—that the commercial and corporate speech cases do not represent a break, radical or otherwise, from the principles that
guided First Amendment jurisprudence over the previous four
decades. Instead, they can be justified by the same principles that
122 For examples of critics who take this position, see Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 Wis L Rev 133, 146, 150 (arguing that the state may regulate commercial
speech more extensively than other kinds of speech due to its “subordinate [constitutional]
status and [the fact that] it is not a speaker-oriented autonomy right” but that the
Supreme Court’s recent advertising cases “undermin[e] the [doctrinal] features that the
Court that created the [commercial speech] doctrine put in place to ensure that the First
Amendment would not be the undoing of the regulatory state”); Post and Shanor, 128 Harv
L Rev F at 170–73 (cited in note 2) (arguing that because commercial speech, unlike political speech, does not contribute to “public discourse,” courts should protect it only to the
extent necessary to protect the flow of accurate information to the public, and criticizing
recent cases for not applying this rule).
123 Central Hudson, 447 US at 589 (Rehnquist dissenting).
124 Weiland, 69 Stan L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 121); Coates, 30 Const Commen at
239 (cited in note 6).
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led the Court in the decades prior to Virginia Pharmacy to extend
protection to labor picketing, movies, music, pulp magazines,
and many other kinds of nondidactic, nonexplicitly political
expression.
Accordingly, the Court did not violate the New Deal settlement when it extended protection to commercial and corporate
speech. Nor does it violate the New Deal settlement when (as is
increasingly the case) it fails to significantly distinguish the protection afforded commercial and political or artistic speech. This
is not to say that there is no respect in which contemporary free
speech law “resurrects Lochner.” But it is not because courts interpret the scope of the First Amendment too expansively, to include economically valuable but constitutionally valueless
speech. Instead its cause must be found elsewhere—as I explore
in Part III.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONVENTIONAL CRITIQUE
To understand why the Burger Court’s decision to extend constitutional protection to commercial advertising and noncommercial corporate speech—or the Court’s more recent tendency to
grant commercial advertising almost the same level of First
Amendment protection as that afforded other kinds of speech—
does not represent the departure from the principles of New Deal
constitutional jurisprudence that critics allege, it is necessary to
first understand what those principles are. More specifically, it is
necessary to understand the limiting principles the Court has employed to ensure that its vigorous enforcement of First Amendment rights does not undermine the balance between judicial and
legislative power that the New Deal settlement was intended to
establish. Only once we understand how modern free speech law
fits into the New Deal settlement can we understand why the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial and corporate speech does not subvert it.
Figuring this out is somewhat more difficult than one might
suppose, given the important role that the First Amendment
played in motivating the central innovation of the New Deal settlement—namely, the bifurcated system of review. As noted in
Part I, a major reason for the Court’s embrace of the two-tiered
system of review was its belief that, although courts should generally defer to the wisdom of legislative decision-making—even
when individual rights were at stake—First Amendment rights
were “special . . . and deserved particular judicial solicitude” due
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to their importance to democratic government.125 It was primarily
with the First Amendment in mind, in other words, that the New
Deal Court developed the bifurcated system. It is no coincidence,
in this respect, that the majority of cases cited in Carolene Products’ famous footnote four are First Amendment cases.126
Despite this fact, the Court rarely referred to Carolene Products in its First Amendment decisions.127 Outside of the advertising cases, it also placed little emphasis on the distinction that
Carolene Products suggested should be the central pivot of the
New Deal settlement—namely, the distinction between laws that
“affect[ ] ordinary commercial transactions” and laws that affect
noncommercial activity.128
In fact, the Court repeatedly rejected the idea that laws regulating speech that occurs in a commercial setting or advances
commercial ends should be subject, for that reason, to mere rational basis scrutiny. In its 1945 decision in Thomas v Collins,129
for example, the Court rigorously scrutinized—and ultimately
struck down—provisions in a Texas law that governed how union
organizers solicited new members, even though it acknowledged
that the unions affected by the law were “engaged in business activities” and that the organizers whose speech it regulated frequently “receive[d] compensation” for their speech.130 “The idea is
not sound,” Justice Wiley Rutledge insisted in his majority opinion, “that the First Amendment’s safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity.”131 Several years later, in
Joseph Burstyn, Inc v Wilson,132 the Court rejected the argument
that movies “do not fall within the First Amendment’s aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a largescale business conducted for private profit.”133 It concluded, to the
125

White, 95 Mich L Rev at 302 (cited in note 51).
Of the seventeen cases cited as support in footnote four, nine are First Amendment
cases. Carolene Products, 304 US at 153 n 4.
127 In the twenty or so years after it was handed down, only two First Amendment
decisions cited Carolene Products for the proposition that courts should apply stricter scrutiny when First Amendment rights were at stake than they applied when other kinds of
rights were threatened. Both, interestingly enough, were picketing cases. See Thomas v
Collins, 323 US 516, 529–30 (1945); Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88, 95–96 (1940).
128 Carolene Products, 304 US at 152.
129 323 US 516 (1945).
130 Id at 531. These facts, it is worth noting, led the Texas Supreme Court to conclude
that rational basis scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, and that the law was
ultimately constitutional. Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex 591, 596 (1943).
131 Collins, 323 US at 531.
132 343 US 495 (1952).
133 Id at 501.
126
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contrary, that like books, magazines, and newspapers, movies
were “a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the
First Amendment.”134
The Court’s willingness to extend First Amendment protection to commercially oriented speech did not mean that it was insensitive to the possibility that the First Amendment could be interpreted so expansively it could unravel the New Deal
settlement. As Professor Jeremy Kessler and others have shown,
members of the New Deal Court were deeply concerned that the
overly aggressive enforcement of First Amendment rights might
undermine the Court’s newly regained legitimacy, as well as the
vitality of the regulatory state.135 The Court’s response to this concern, however, was not to categorically deny protection to speech
that was motivated by economic concerns, related to commercial
matters, or sold in the marketplace.136
Some members of the Court suggested that this was how the
First Amendment should be interpreted. Justices Stanley Reed,
Robert Jackson, and Felix Frankfurter, for example, objected to a
series of decisions in which the Court held that laws that imposed
a fixed license tax on those who sold books and pamphlets door to
door violated the freedom of speech as well as the free exercise
rights of those they regulated.137 They argued that, by extending
protection to what was essentially commercial activity, these decisions threatened the delicate balance between legislative and
judicial power that the Court had only very recently put in
place.138
134

Id.
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 Colum
L Rev 1915, 1956–76 (2016).
136 See Douglas v City of Jeannette, 319 US 157, 179–81 (1943) (Jackson concurring).
137 Id at 181–82; Jones v City of Opelika, 319 US 103, 117 (1943) (Reed dissenting);
Jones, 319 US at 134 (Frankfurter dissenting).
138 See, for example, Jones, 319 US at 131–32 (Reed dissenting):
135

[W]e [do not] think it can be said, properly, that these sales of religious books
are religious exercises. . . . And even if the distribution of religious books was a
religious practice protected from regulation by the First Amendment, certainly
the affixation of a price for the articles would destroy the sacred character of the
transaction. The evangelist becomes also a book agent.
See also id at 133:
The limitations of the Constitution are not maxims of social wisdom but definite
controls on the legislative process. We are dealing with power, not its abuse. This
late withdrawal of the power of taxation over the distribution activities of those
covered by the First Amendment fixes what seems to us an unfortunate principle
of tax exemption, capable of indefinite extension.
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The majority of justices on the Court unequivocally rejected
this argument, however. They insisted that the First Amendment
not only protects the commercial sale of expressive materials but
also prevents local governments from requiring those who wished
to engage in this kind of activity to pay for the privilege of doing
so. This was the case, Justice William O. Douglas explained in his
majority opinion in Murdock v Pennsylvania,139 because any other
rule would give local governments the power to prevent groups
they disliked from spreading their message from door to door, by
making it too costly for them to do so.140 The Court recognized, in
other words, that in our highly commodified public sphere, a great
deal of important expression takes the form of a commodity, and
interpreted the First Amendment accordingly. It refused, as a result, to restrict constitutional protection to only noncommodified
speech.
The Court instead limited the reach of the First Amendment
in other ways. It insisted, for example, that courts did not need to
rigorously scrutinize laws that merely incidentally restrict First
Amendment rights. Hence, in Associated Press v National Labor
Relations Board,141 in 1937, a five-member majority of the Court
adamantly rejected the argument that the First Amendment prevented Congress from enforcing the National Labor Relations Act
against media companies like the Associated Press (AP).142 “The
business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation,”
the Court explained, “because it is an agency of the press. The
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.”143 Because the Act did not in any way restrict publishers from “publish[ing] the news as [they] desire[d] it
published,” the Court deferred to Congress’s judgment that the
law was an “appropriate regulation[ ] . . . for the protection and
advancement . . . [of interstate] commerce.”144

139
140

319 US 105 (1943).
Id at 115:

The way of the religious dissenter has long been hard. But if the formula of this
type of ordinance is approved, a new device for the suppression of religious minorities will have been found. This method of disseminating religious beliefs can
be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town, village by village.
141
142
143
144

301 US 103 (1937).
Id at 130–31.
Id at 132.
Id at 129, 133.
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The Court also applied deferential scrutiny to laws that directly regulated speech that, on its view, had nothing to contribute to public debate. In Chaplinsky v New Hampshire,145 for example, the Court held that the First Amendment imposes no
restrictions on the government’s ability to punish the public use
of derogatory comments, or “fighting words,” because speech of
this kind possesses “such slight social value” that even its total
prohibition would not significantly undermine the search for
truth or, presumably, any of the other goods the First Amendment safeguards.146
As these cases make clear, the Court reconciled vigorous protection for speech with the New Deal order not by restricting judicial activism to a noncommercial sphere, but by employing a
purposive interpretation of the First Amendment’s reach: by insisting, in other words, that heightened scrutiny was necessary
only when “the regulation of communication affect[ed] a constitutional value specifically protected by the First Amendment.”147
The result was the creation of a free speech jurisprudence that,
even as it markedly constrained legislative power in some respects, imposed few constraints on it in others.
Critics are absolutely right, therefore, when they assert that
under the free speech principles articulated first by the New Deal
Court, laws regulating commercial and corporate speech should
be subject to heightened scrutiny only when they threaten interests that are, as Professors Jackson and Jeffries put it, “appropriate for [ ] vindication under the [F]irst [A]mendment.”148 The mere
fact that they regulate speech is not a sufficient reason, on its
own, to do so. Nor could it be, given how much human conduct
involves expressive activity, in one form or another. As Professor
Fred Schauer notes:
“Speech” is what we use to enter into contracts, make wills,
sell securities, warrant the quality of the goods we sell, fix
prices, place bets, bid at auctions, enter into conspiracies,
commit blackmail, threaten, give evidence at trials, and do
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315 US 568 (1942).
Id at 572.
147 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L Rev 1,
9 (2000).
148 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 6 (cited in note 3).
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most of the other things that occupy our days and occupy the
courts.149
A rule that required heightened scrutiny whenever the government regulates speech, let alone expressive conduct, would effectively constitutionalize great swathes of both criminal and civil
law. It would threaten the bifurcated system of review as surely
as the resurrection of a freedom to contract would—and perhaps
more so.
Critics are wrong, however, when they conclude from this fact
that the First Amendment should be understood to impose little
or no constraint on the government when it regulates commercial
advertising or the speech of business corporations. This is because
when the government regulates commercial advertising and at
least some kinds of corporate speech, its actions do threaten free
speech values. They threaten, more specifically, what the Court
insisted again and again was the primary social good that the
First Amendment protected: namely, the “free political discussion” necessary to ensure that “government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.”150 As a result, we do not have to answer the difficult question of whether and to what extent individuals engage in self-expression when they write or pay for
advertisements, or when they speak or pay for speech in a corporation’s name.
Even if we think of the First Amendment exclusively as an
instrument for “assur[ing] [the] unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people,” a strong argument can be made that when the government regulates purely commercial advertising or regulates at
least some kinds of corporate speech, its actions can threaten
First Amendment values, and therefore should be subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny.151 This is because of two other principles of modern free speech jurisprudence that critics of the commercial advertising and corporate speech cases tend to ignore.
The first is the principle that speech need not touch explicitly
on politics to contribute to the free political discussion necessary
to ensuring responsive democratic government. The Court made

149 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1773 (2004).
150 De Jonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 365 (1937).
151 See Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484 (1957).
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this clear very early on when, in Stromberg v California152 in 1931,
it struck down a California law that made it a crime to “display[ ]
a red flag . . . as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government” because it found that the law could be used to
punish those who raised the red flag to symbolize purely “peaceful
and orderly opposition to government” and therefore interfered
with the “free political discussion” that the First Amendment
guaranteed.153 In holding as much, the Court took for granted that
speech can have political significance even when it makes no explicit political claims and is designed to appeal primarily to its
audience’s emotional, as opposed to cognitive, faculties—as the
raising of the red flag clearly was.154
In later cases, the Court extended constitutional protection
to much less obviously political kinds of speech because it recognized that those too could contribute, however indirectly, to political debate. In Winters v New York,155 for example, the Court
struck down a New York law that prohibited the distribution of
what were colloquially known as “true crime magazines.”156 Like
the flag raising prohibited by the California law, the magazines
prohibited by the New York law made no explicit political claims.
Instead, they consisted almost entirely of highly sensationalized,
albeit generally true, stories of violent crime.157 Unlike the raising
of the flag, true crime magazines were not intended to advance a
radical political agenda, nor were they closely associated with a
particular political viewpoint. Instead, they served crassly commercial ends.158 The Court nevertheless held that the magazines
were “as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best
of literature” even though Justice Reed acknowledged in his majority opinion that the justices were unable to identify anything
152

283 US 359 (1931).
Id at 361, 369.
154 Only Justice Pierce Butler, in his dissent, challenged the assumption that the raising of a red flag constituted the kind of expressive activity that was protected by the
Speech Clause. Id at 376 (Butler dissenting) (questioning “whether the mere display of a
flag as the emblem of a purpose, whatever its sort, is speech within the meaning of the
constitutional protection of speech and press”).
155 333 US 507 (1948).
156 Id at 519–20.
157 See Jean Murley, The Rise of True Crime: Twentieth Century Murder and American Popular Culture 19–21 (Praeger 2008).
158 The magazines did tend to advance, on their surface at least, conservative lawand-order messages. However, these messages were undermined by the sensationalism of
the stories they contained. Id at 23 (noting that the true crime magazines tended to “juxtapose[ ] a sharp emphasis on law enforcement . . . with an equally strong but opposing
impulse to sensationalize crime and make it more interesting to readers”).
153
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“of any possible value to society” in their contents.159 It did so because it recognized that even if its members were not affected by
the stories the magazines told, others might be. As Justice Reed
noted, “Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s
doctrine.”160
In other cases, the Court employed a similarly capacious view
of what speech matters politically. In Joseph Burstyn, for example, the Court extended Winters’s logic to conclude that movies
were also entitled to full First Amendment protection. “It cannot
be doubted,” Justice Tom Clark wrote for the majority, “that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of
ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety
of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”161 In concluding as much, the Court overruled
an early twentieth-century decision which found that movies
were not entitled to free speech protection because they were
“spectacles . . . mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known.”162 “The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion,” it asserted, “is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to
inform.”163
Meanwhile, in Thornhill v Alabama,164 the Court extended
protection to labor picketing—to speech that, on its face, concerned solely the private economic relationship between workers
and their employer—because it recognized that pickets conveyed
valuable information to the public about what was “[i]n the circumstances of [the] times” a pressing political issue: namely, labor unrest.165 They had the capacity to affect public attitudes
about political matters, in other words, even when they said nothing about politics per se.
The New Deal Court’s willingness to extend First Amendment protection to overtly nonpolitical, even spectacular kinds of
expression was an important reason why critics such as Professor

159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Winters, 333 US at 510.
Id.
Joseph Burstyn, 343 US at 501.
Mutual Film Corp v Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 US 230, 244 (1915).
Joseph Burstyn, 343 US at 501.
310 US 88 (1940).
Id at 102.
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Hamilton, Braden, and Justice Frankfurter accused it of
Lochnerism. Indeed, one of the two cases that Hamilton and
Braden invoked to illustrate the excessive power that the Court
had aggrandized to itself in its free speech jurisprudence was
Thornhill.166 (The other was another labor picketing case, Milk
Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v Meadowmoor Dairies.167) Justice Frankfurter, meanwhile, invoked the specter of Lochner not
only in his dissenting opinion in Barnette (a symbolic speech
case), but in the dissenting opinion he wrote in Winters. “The
painful experience which resulted from confusing economic
dogmas with constitutional edicts,” Justice Frankfurter argued,
“ought not to be repeated by finding constitutional barriers to a
State’s policy regarding crime, because it may run counter to our
inexpert psychological assumptions or offend our presuppositions
regarding incitements to crime in relation to the curtailment of
utterance.”168
Rather than evidence of an unjustified judicial intrusion into
the prerogatives of the democratic legislature, however, what decisions such as Winters, Joseph Burstyn, and Thornhill reflect is
the Court’s quite sophisticated understanding of how it is that
citizens in a democratic society come to form, or alter, their political beliefs. Scholars have accused the modern free speech tradition of being overly rationalist in its assumptions about how communication occurs in the mass public sphere. Professor Stanley
Ingber has argued, for example, that a central assumption of the
modern free speech tradition is that “people can use reason to focus on the substance of a message and to distinguish and reject
the emotional and irrational appeals of its packaging.”169 In fact,
what cases such as Winters and Joseph Burstyn make clear is that
the Court has, for decades now, recognized that the emotional and
irrational aspects of speech play an important role in shaping
popular attitudes and beliefs about political, and other, matters—
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Hamilton and Braden, 50 Yale L J at 1352 & n 140 (cited in note 40).
Id at 1352 & n 141, citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc, 312 US 287 (1941).
168 Winters, 333 US at 527 (Frankfurter dissenting).
169 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1,
35. See also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U Ill L Rev 799, 801 (asserting that the assumption that underlies
the “vast majority of First Amendment cases . . . is that audiences are capable of rationally
assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech”); Jerome A. Barron, Access to
the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv L Rev 1641, 1678 (1967) (critiquing
the “essentially rationalist philosophy of the [F]irst [A]mendment”).
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that they are not just part of the package, but an intrinsic part of
the message that is communicated. What these cases also make
clear is the Court’s refusal to allow an overly rationalistic—and
perhaps also overly elitist—view of how communication occurs in
the public sphere from unduly limiting the First Amendment’s
reach.
Certainly, the effect of decisions such as Winters, Joseph
Burstyn, and Thornhill was to extend constitutional protection to
the vast body of expression that contributed to the mid-twentiethcentury mass public sphere. In this respect what these decisions
also reflect is the Court’s efforts during this period to craft a free
speech jurisprudence that guaranteed protection not only to the
elite and well-educated but to the “little people” as well.170 They
point, in other words, to the egalitarianism of the New Deal
Court’s free speech jurisprudence, generally—an egalitarianism
that I explore in more detail in Part III.
For our part, they mean that critics of the Court’s commercial
and corporate speech cases have been asking the wrong question.
To determine whether commercial advertising or noncommercial
corporate speech possesses democratic and therefore constitutional value, the relevant question is not whether speech of this
sort explicitly comments on governmental policy or marshals information that is directly relevant to policy action.
Nor, for that matter, is the relevant question whether speech
of this sort expresses ideas or messages that otherwise could not
be publicly expressed. In none of the cases discussed above did
the Court condition constitutional protection on a showing that
the ideas or messages conveyed by the movies, magazines, or music subject to regulation could not be expressed in other venues
and by other means. This is because of another important principle of modern free speech jurisprudence that critics of the corporate speech cases tend to ignore: namely, that the government
cannot inoculate itself against constitutional scrutiny simply by
providing speakers with some other venue in which to speak. As
the Court noted in Schneider v State171 in 1939, and reaffirmed on
many occasions later, “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty
of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it

170 Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141, 146 (1943). The phrase “little people” is of
course a patronizing one. As such, it aptly illustrates the New Deal Court’s often awkward,
but nevertheless valiant, efforts to surmount its own elitism.
171 308 US 147 (1939).
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may be exercised in some other place.”172 This principle reflects
the Court’s recognition of the fact that speech is nonfungible:
where one speaks can matter tremendously to what one conveys,
and even when the government merely limits where and how
speech occurs, its actions can significantly affect the formation of
public opinion.173 This is obviously as true of speech that is the
product of a corporate author as it is of any other kind of speech.
As a result, whether a natural person could convey the same message that a corporation wishes to communicate is utterly irrelevant to the first-order question of whether corporate speech has
constitutional value.
Instead, the only question that courts need to ask to determine whether the direct regulation of commercial or corporate
speech threatens free speech values, and therefore warrants
heightened scrutiny, under the principles laid down by the New
Deal Court, is: Is speech of this kind capable of affecting public
attitudes about the important social and political issues of the
day, either directly, via tactics of didactic persuasion, or indirectly, by means of the “subtle shaping of thought”?174 When
phrased as such, the answer to the question is undoubtedly yes,
both with respect to the speech protected by the corporate speech
cases and commercial advertising.
A. Corporate Speech
This conclusion is obvious when it comes to noncommercial
corporate speech, like the speech at issue in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison. After all, in both those cases, the corporations
wished to speak about what the Thornhill Court called “matters
of public concern.”175 It is hard to think of more obviously important public questions than the merits of a graduated income
172 Id at 163. See also Struthers, 319 US at 150 (Murphy concurring); Thornhill, 310
US at 105–06.
173 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 68 (1987):

Although rules prohibiting demonstrations in the curtilage of a jailhouse, noisy
protests near a school, and leafletting on the grounds of a state fair may have
little effect on the vast majority of speakers, they may have a significant effect
on those speakers whose messages are tied directly to the jail, the school, or the
state fair. By denying these speakers access to what are the most logical targets
of their expression, such regulations deprive them of access to the most important audience and prevent them from utilizing especially dramatic and effective means of communication.
174
175

Joseph Burstyn, 343 US at 501.
Thornhill, 310 US at 101.
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tax, or the costs and benefits of nuclear power plants.176 Furthermore, like the movies, magazines, and labor pickets to which the
Court extended protection in the cases cited above, the corporate
speech in both cases addressed a general public audience. It thus
presumably had as much ability to affect public attitudes and beliefs as those other kinds of speech.
This means that the Court was correct to conclude in both
Bellotti and Consolidated Edison that, given the existing precedents, the appropriate standard of review was not the deferential
scrutiny applied to laws that regulate “ordinary commercial” activity but the more stringent scrutiny applied when First Amendment rights are at stake. This is the case notwithstanding the fact
that—in Bellotti, and in campaign finance cases that built on
Bellotti, such as Citizens United—the government did not regulate the corporation’s speech directly, by dictating what it could
or could not say in its own voice, but instead regulated it indirectly, by limiting its ability to spend money on speech.177
Some critics have argued that this distinction matters: that
even if rigorous judicial scrutiny is appropriate when the government directly regulates what corporations say, a more deferential
standard of review is appropriate when the government regulates
corporate spending on speech. Judge J. Skelly Wright famously
argued, for example, that the spending of money on speech should
be treated as conduct, rather than “pure speech,” and that laws
regulating such spending should be subjected to the much more
deferential scrutiny applied to incidental regulations of speech,
like the generally applicable business laws at issue in Associated
Press v NLRB.178 But, as the discussion earlier makes clear, the
Court only applied deferential scrutiny in Associated Press because it found that doing so would not significantly impede the
ability of the members of the AP to communicate what they
wanted to say.179 The same is not necessarily true of laws that
restrict spending on speech. To say that one may not pay for
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See Bellotti, 435 US at 769; Consolidated Edison, 447 US at 532.
The statute challenged in Bellotti prohibited corporations from spending money to
influence “the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.” Bellotti, 435 US at
767–68. The law challenged in Citizens United prohibited corporations (and unions) from
using general treasury funds to pay for speech that “expressly advocate[d] the election or
defeat of a candidate.” Citizens United, 558 US at 320–21.
178 J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L J 1001,
1006 (1976).
179 Associated Press, 301 US at 133.
177
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speech is, in many contexts at least, tantamount to saying that
one cannot speak. This makes the application of deferential scrutiny in corporate spending cases hard to square with the modern
precedents and the principles that inform them.
The fact that the Court was operating squarely within the
modern free speech tradition when it interpreted the First Amendment to require exacting scrutiny of the ballot law in Bellotti or
the regulatory ban in Consolidated Edison doesn’t mean, of course,
that it couldn’t have crafted an exception for the speech of business
corporations. But the decision to do so would have constituted the
deviation from New Deal principles, not the opposite. This is not,
it is worth pointing out, because heightened scrutiny of laws that
regulate corporate speech is necessary to protect the interests of
the corporate speaker, who may indeed have “no soul to damn and
no body to kick.”180 Heightened scrutiny is necessary to protect the
right of the public to hear what the corporation has to say—as
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bellotti held quite explicitly.181
Scholars have both criticized and praised the commercial and
corporate speech cases for shifting the focus of First Amendment
jurisprudence away from what they claim was its earlier focus on
the rights of the speaker and focusing instead on the rights of the
audience.182 But in fact the New Deal Court was vitally concerned
with the right of the public to access speech, not just the right of
the speaker to express it. In Thornhill, for example, the Court declared the purpose of the free speech guarantee to be to “supply
the public need for information and education with respect to the

180 John C. Coffee Jr, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich L Rev 386, 386 (1981).
181 Bellotti, 435 US at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”) (emphasis added).
182 For scholars who have made claims of this sort, see, for example, Burt Neuborne,
The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 Brooklyn L Rev
5, 6 (1989) (arguing that the commercial speech cases represent the shift toward “a hearercentered free speech doctrine” and away from “the speaker-centered [F]irst [A]mendment
doctrine developed during the last sixty years in the areas of religion, politics, science, and
art”); Post, 48 UCLA L Rev at 14 (cited in note 147) (arguing that constitutional protection
for commercial speech is justified by the right of listeners, “the need to receive information,
rather than [by] the rights of speakers” and that this distinguishes it from other kinds of
speech—including political, artistic, and scientific speech—that are justified by the rights
of speakers to participate in “public discourse”); Shanor, 2016 Wis L Rev at 145–46 (cited
in note 122) (arguing that although First Amendment protection for commercial speech
has been “framed . . . as a listener-based right . . . , paradigmatic [that is, noncommercial]
First Amendment speech is generally protected not because of the value of the speech to
its audience but due to the right of the speaker to speak”).
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significant issues of the times,” and insisted that unions had to be
free to engage in labor pickets not so that they could advance their
economic self-interest but so that members of the public could
learn about the causes, and nature, of labor disputes and on that
basis, make “effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”183 Five years later, the Court again asserted that the purpose
of the First Amendment was to allow the public to access “the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.”184
The fact that the First Amendment has traditionally cared
about the rights of the audience means that many of the questions
that preoccupy scholarly discussion about the corporate speech
and campaign finance cases—such as, whether corporations can
speak like natural persons, or whether the spending of money is
itself an expressive act—are simply beside the point, at least
when it comes to the threshold question of whether heightened
scrutiny applies.185 Even if we assume that spending is not an intrinsically expressive act, and even if we assume that corporations have no constitutional value as speakers in their own right,
it is nevertheless the case that the direct as well as indirect regulation of corporate speech threatens the First Amendment rights
of the audience to access a “diverse and antagonistic” public
sphere whose terms, and limits, are not set by the government.
This doesn’t mean, of course, that speech of this kind cannot be
regulated. But it does mean that the same constraints that apply
when the government regulates noncorporate speech should apply when it regulates speech of this kind.
B. Advertising
The same is true when the government regulates commercial
advertising, although the analysis here is less straightforward,
given the explicitly nonpolitical nature of the speech. But here
too, once one takes the implicit, affective, and aesthetic content of
commercial advertising into account, it becomes obvious that
183

Thornhill, 310 US at 102–03.
Associated Press v United States, 326 US 1, 20 (1945).
185 For an argument on the first point, see Charles R. O’Kelley Jr, The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 Georgetown L J 1347, 1351 (1979). For a nuanced
analysis of arguments about the expressive nature of spending money, see Deborah
Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 Minn L Rev 953, 969–70 (2011).
184
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even “purely” commercial ads like the ads in Virginia Pharmacy
have the capacity to shape public attitudes about important matters of public concern in at least two ways—the first of which the
Court has discussed in some detail, the second of which it has not.
1. Advertising as information.
First, even if commercial advertisements do not explicitly
comment on political debates, they do provide their audience a
great deal of information about “who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price.”186 In Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court argued that information of this kind was
constitutionally valuable for two reasons: first, because it helps
ensure that when consumers make purchasing decisions, they are
“intelligent and well informed” and thereby makes the operation
of the market system more efficient;187 second, because it enables
citizens to form intelligent decisions about whether, and to what
extent, the economy should be regulated.188 The Court’s first argument for why the information that commercial ads provide is
constitutionally valuable is far from satisfying. Market efficiency
is simply not a value the First Amendment has been understood,
in its modern incarnation, to protect. To the contrary: the cases
strongly suggest that under the New Deal settlement it is the legislature, not the judiciary, that has responsibility for determining
how efficient the market should be.189
The Court’s second argument for why the information that
commercial advertisements communicate is constitutionally valuable is more persuasive, however. This is because, under the
New Deal settlement, it is the responsibility of the courts to ensure that voters have the necessary authority to oversee the democratic branches’ regulation of the market. Ensuring the free flow
of information about who is selling what at what price obviously
helps voters do so.
To see this, one need only consider the advertisements in
Virginia Pharmacy. In that case, state law prohibited pharmacies
186

Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 765.
Id.
188 Id.
189 See, for example, Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc, 348 US 483, 487–88
(1955). See also Post, 48 UCLA L Rev at 9 (cited in note 147) (“The First Amendment does
not require courts to scrutinize government actions that directly interfere with the efficiency of the market, as for example by setting prices or prohibiting products. Why then
should the First Amendment be concerned with the more indirect effects of advertising
regulations on market efficiency?”).
187
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from advertising by almost any means the prices of the prescription drugs they sold.190 The result was that it was very difficult for
consumers in Virginia to learn about the significant price differences that existed in different pharmacies across the state.191 This
made it difficult not only to price shop, but also to evaluate the
wisdom of the Virginia legislature’s decision not to regulate pharmaceutical prices. That decision was by no means politically uncontroversial. Since the late 1950s, consumer advocates had been
urging state and federal lawmakers to impose price caps or take
other measures to prevent the price gouging that many claimed
pervaded the industry.192 These calls for reform almost entirely
failed to result in meaningful price control legislation.193 Instead,
the only way in which Virginia and many states regulated pharmaceutical prices was by banning advertising about them—a
state of affairs that some attributed to the power of the pharmacy
lobby.194
One could, consequently, interpret the Virginia law as an effort by the legislature to protect the political as well as the economic status quo by depriving citizens of the information necessary to change it. Even if this were not the case, the fact that there
was significant political debate about how to regulate drug prices
in the 1960s and 1970s makes it difficult to see why the ads prohibited by the Virginia law touched any less on matters of public
concern than the speech punished by the antipicketing law struck
down in Thornhill. In both cases, the legislature restricted the
public dissemination of speech that, although such speech did not
comment explicitly on political matters, nevertheless communicated information that was directly relevant to contemporary political debates (debates about how to regulate drug prices in the
first case, and debates about how to regulate labor in the second
190

Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 752.
As the Court noted, the price of the same drug could vary by as much as 650 percent. Id at 754.
192 See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 Berkeley Tech L J 853, 867 (2003)
(describing these efforts).
193 Id.
194 Dale A. Danneman, Retail Drug Advertising Bans Are Bad Medicine for Consumers—Is There a Sherman Act Prescription?, 15 Ariz L Rev 117, 120 (1973) (citation
omitted):
191

[T]he National Association of Retail Druggists has been said to be, at one time
at least, the most politically powerful retail trade association in the United
States. It is thus no wonder that the associations have been able to keep consumers in the dark in regard to prescription drug pricing.
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case). The same reasoning that led the Thornhill Court to conclude that the First Amendment protects labor pickets should
therefore lead to the same conclusion about commercial ads—at
least commercial ads that provide information about politically
controversial products, services, or industries.195 This turns out to
include a wide swathe of advertising.
Indeed, one can easily find many other examples of “purely
commercial advertising”196 that nevertheless provides politically
relevant market information. Consider in this respect the gambling ads at issue in Posadas. In that case, a Puerto Rican casino
brought a First Amendment challenge to a law that prohibited
casinos that operated in the territory from advertising their services to local residents.197 The government argued that the law
was intended to prevent residents from patronizing the casinos,
and to thereby prevent the social problems that would be created
were Puerto Ricans to gamble in significant numbers.198 Critics
have suggested that the real motivation for the law may have
been more nefarious—that, like the ban on drug-price advertising
in Virginia, the advertising ban was an anticompetitive measure
that worked to preserve the economic power of established industry players.199 Whatever the law’s true motivations, it is indisputable that one of its effects was to make the decision to legalize
gambling in Puerto Rico less salient to voters. This was a decision
that generated significant opposition, both in 1948, when it was
first made, and in the decades that followed.200 Like the Virginia

195 This is certainly what the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) argued in the brief it filed against the advertising ban.
Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Posadas de Puerto Rico v
Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, No 84-1903, *11–12 (US filed Dec 12, 1985) (available
on Westlaw at 1985 WL 669449). The AFL-CIO presumably filed the brief because it recognized the logical connection between labor speech and commercial advertising and
feared that restrictions on the First Amendment rights of the latter could be used to constrict the First Amendment rights of the former.
196 Id at *13.
197 Posadas, 478 US at 332–34. The casinos that operated in Puerto Rico were intended to serve an exclusively tourist clientele. Id at 332.
198 Id at 341.
199 David A. Strauss, Constitutional Protection for Commercial Speech: Some Lessons
from the American Experience, 17 Can Bus L J 45, 46–47 (1990) (suggesting that “[t]he
Puerto Rican ban on casino advertising [may not have] reflect[ed] a public-interested effort
to discourage Puerto Ricans from gambling” but instead may have been “a way for the
casinos to cartelize their industry”).
200 As Professor Dennis Merrill notes, the decision to legalize gambling in Puerto Rico
was initially “opposed by many Puerto Ricans” because they feared “its many unsavory
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ban on drug-price advertising, the law thus helped preserve the
political as well as the economic status quo.
These examples demonstrate how difficult it can be to distinguish between economically relevant and politically relevant information in a post–Carolene Products world—that is, in a world
in which decisions about economic policy are left almost entirely
up to the democratic political process. In such a world, it makes
sense to conclude, as the Court did in Virginia Pharmacy, that
any ad that communicates to its readers information about “who
is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price”201 has the capacity to impact public attitudes and beliefs about what, under the New Deal settlement, is supposed to
be a core matter of public concern—namely, whether and how to
regulate the market.
2. Advertising as art.
What the Court has described as the “informational function”
of commercial advertising202 does not entirely explain, however,
why advertising as a genre receives the constitutional protection
it does. This is because, although many commercial ads communicate information about who is selling what, where, and at what
price, many ads do not. A significant portion of contemporary advertising spending goes to what we might call “image” as opposed
to informational advertising.203 Image ads persuade consumers to
buy the products they advertise not by providing them with information about the wonderful features of that product but instead
by associating that product with positive images or ideas.204

side effects, especially infiltration by organized crime, as had occurred in nearby Cuba.”
Dennis Merrill, Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century
Latin America 187 (UNC 2009). In the decades after, opposition to the casinos only continued to grow. Dennis Merrill, Negotiating Cold War Paradise: U.S. Tourism, Economic
Planning, and Cultural Modernity in Twentieth-Century Puerto Rico, 25 Diplomatic Hist
179, 197–98 (2001).
201 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 765.
202 Central Hudson, 447 US at 563.
203 Mark Snyder and Kenneth G. DeBono, Appeals to Image and Claims About
Quality: Understanding the Psychology of Advertising, 49 J Personality & Soc Psych 586,
586 (1985).
204 See id at 586–87. See also William Leiss, Stephen Kline, and Sut Jhally, Social
Communication in Advertising 43 (Routledge 2d ed 1990) (noting that “the information
model has never had much relevance for national consumer product advertising” because
“[t]he explicit function of spectacular image-based . . . advertising is not so much to inform
as it is to persuade”).
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A good example of an image ad is the Coca-Cola “Hilltop” ad
from the early 1970s. In the ad, dozens of attractive young people,
of different skin colors and wearing clothing from different regions of the world, sing “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” while
holding bottles of Coca-Cola in their hands.205 The ad was famously successful. It is credited with helping Coca-Cola reform
its image as the “stodgy” soda and outperform its rival, PepsiCola, in sales among young people.206 Yet it communicated very
little, if any, novel information to its audience. In 1971, it was not
news to anyone that Coca-Cola was a beverage, that it was sold
in glass bottles with a red and white label, or that it was brown
in color. Nor did the song, or the slogan that appeared at the end
of the ad (“It’s the real thing. Coke.”) communicate any novel market information. After all, what the ad meant by saying that Coke
was the real thing was not that it was “really” Coke but that it
was really good at bringing people together.207 It is difficult to see
how information of this kind—if we can call it that—had any
bearing on debates about how to regulate the soda industry, assuming they existed. It is consequently difficult to justify constitutional protection for this ad, or the many similar image ads that
populate magazines and television, by making an argument about
the political relevance of the market information they provide.
And yet nothing in any of the First Amendment cases suggests
that the Hilltop ad should be treated any differently than the drug
price ads in Virginia Pharmacy.
Although the Court has never really explained why image
ads are entitled to constitutional protection, it is easy enough to
understand. These ads may not provide consumers much information about existing market conditions, but they possess the capacity to shape public attitudes in another way. By putting into
circulation highly curated images of “the good,” they help naturalize, reaffirm—and sometimes reshape—social values.

205 See Coca-Cola, 1971 - ‘Hilltop’; “I’d like to buy the world a Coke”, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VM2eLhvsSM (visited Apr 28, 2020) (Perma archive
unavailable).
206 See Douglas B. Holt, How Brands Become Icons: The Principles of Cultural Branding 233–34 (Harvard Business 2004).
207 This was made clear by the slogan of Coca-Cola’s previous advertising spot, entitled Friendly Feelings, which included the slogan “Coca-Cola, it’s the real thing, like
friendly feelings.” Jeff Chang, Who We Be: A Cultural History of Race in Post-Civil Rights
America 61 (St. Martin’s 2014).
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Consider once again the Hilltop ad. The ad encouraged its
viewers to drink Coca-Cola by linking the beverage to an important symbol of youth culture—the flower power movement—
and to the values it promoted (optimism, peace, cosmopolitanism). By doing so, the ad helped Coca-Cola position itself as the
young people’s drink. But it also reshaped popular conceptions of
the flower power movement, by denuding it of its harder edges—
its association with antiwar activism for example—and by suggesting that all that was necessary to achieve international peace
and brotherhood was shared consumption of a sugary good.208
Or consider another successful advertising campaign: the
“You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby!” campaign produced by the
Philip Morris Tobacco Company to sell its Virginia Slims cigarettes to women. The campaign is famous—perhaps infamous—
for using the iconography of the feminist movement to sell cigarettes to a female audience.209 But the relationship did not go only
one way. By linking its cigarettes to women’s empowerment,
Philip Morris managed not only to make its cigarettes attractive
to female consumers; it also shaped consumers’ conception of
what an empowered woman looked like. This is one reason why
the ads were regarded with ambivalence by at least some contemporary feminists.210 The campaign domesticated feminism by
feminizing it—but it also popularized the movement by defanging
it, rendering it more attractive, less threatening, and more
mainstream.211
208 See Laura A. Hymson, The Company That Taught the World to Sing: Coca-Cola,
Globalization, and the Cultural Politics of Branding in the Twentieth Century *204 (unpublished dissertation, 2011) (on file with author) (“The [H]illtop commercial . . . leveraged
Coca-Cola’s global reach as a promise of peace and unity to American consumers in a way
that made them feel good about Coke and about being American” even while “disavow[ing]
continuing racial unrest [in the United States and elsewhere] and the international fears
of nuclear war and communism.”).
209 See Emily Westkaemper, Selling Women’s History: Packaging Feminism in
Twentieth-Century American Popular Culture 164 (Rutgers 2017).
210 For example, Ms. magazine struggled to decide whether Virginia Slims advertisements could run in its pages, notwithstanding the magazine’s editorial policy to avoid ads
that objectified women. Id at 188. The magazine printed one Virginia Slims ad, and also
featured a mail-in offer for a Virginia Slims promotional calendar but, after readers protested, the magazine refused to print further ads. Id. Other self-described feminists celebrated the ad campaign as evidence of women’s progress, however. Id at 178–80.
211 See Andrew Wernick, Promotional Culture: Advertising, Ideology, and Symbolic
Expression 36 (Sage 1991):

Virginia Slims . . . construct[ed] an ambiguous image of female-ness which encapsulated the ambivalence of those women most likely to be drawn towards a
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Advertisers’ ability to sell sometimes utterly prosaic commodities by linking them symbolically to otherwise unrelated ideas,
institutions, or practices led the sociologist Raymond Williams to
describe modern advertising as “a highly organized and professional system of magical inducements . . . functionally very similar to magical systems in simpler societies.”212 For our purposes,
what it means is that even when they do not provide much verifiable information about the products they promote, ads possess
constitutional value for the same reason that movies and video
games do: because they not only amuse, entertain, and distract
but also shape public attitudes about all kinds of matters that
have nothing to do with how best to regulate the market. They do
so by “creat[ing] structures of meaning” that “mould[ ] and reflect[ ] our life today.”213 Or as Professor Andrew Wernick puts it:
“[T]he brand-imaging of mass produced consumer goods links
them symbolically to the whole world of social values. . . . By representing such values as just part of the visual furniture, the ad
naturalizes them, and to that extent reinforces their hold.”214
We may not like the fact that commercial ads possess this
power. Concern with the detrimental effect that ads can have on
public attitudes is in fact an important reason why governments
seek to regulate them.215 It nevertheless means that, under New
Deal principles, ads are as much entitled to constitutional protection as are the other expressive commodities (such as movies,
magazines, television shows, and pop songs) that populate the
contemporary public sphere and that shape public attitudes by
gender-marked cigarette. At its heart was a compromise formula in which old
(patriarchal) and new (liberal-egalitarian) conceptions of female gender identity
were both given a place.
212 Raymond Williams, Advertising: The Magic System, in Raymond Williams, ed,
Problems in Materialism and Culture 185 (Verso 1980).
213 Judith Williamson, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising 11–12 (Marion Boyars 1978).
214 Wernick, Promotional Culture at 22–23 (cited in note 211).
215 This was certainly true of the gambling ads at issue in Posadas. As the government
explained, the reason it prohibited casino ads targeted at a domestic audience was because
it feared that the ads would make gambling appear too enticing and would thereby undermine the “moral and cultural patterns” that (it claimed) organized Puerto Rican society.
Posadas, 478 US at 341. More recent advertising regulations also seek to limit what advertisers can portray in order to mitigate the presumably detrimental cultural effects of
the ads that they produce. For example, the British trade group, the Advertising Standards Authority, prohibits advertisers from depicting human bodies in a “socially irresponsible” manner—that is, in a manner that valorizes being unhealthily thin. See Social Responsibility: Body Image (Advertising Standards Authority, June 14, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/776Y-4A3T.
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telling their audience attractive stories about how the world is, or
how it could be. This is not because the messages that ads communicate are necessarily socially valuable ones. We may think, to
the contrary, that they are overly materialistic,216 inevitably conservative,217 or simply not as valuable as the messages communicated by political or artistic speech.218 Nevertheless, cases like
Winters and Joseph Burstyn make clear that courts should closely
scrutinize how and why they are regulated, because to do otherwise would be to vest the government with largely unconstrained
power over an important site of public meaning-making and, ultimately, politics.
C. Implications
The preceding discussion suggests that it is not the Virginia
Pharmacy Court’s conclusion that advertising is entitled to First
Amendment protection that is difficult to reconcile with the principles that undergird modern free speech law.219 Nor is it the assertion in Bellotti that corporate speech that touches on matters
of public concern is “at the heart of the First Amendment[ ]” that
is difficult to do so.220 Instead, it is the Court’s rather offhand assertion in Valentine in 1942 that the First Amendment “imposes
no [ ] restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising” that is difficult to reconcile with the rest of the New
Deal precedents.221
In fact, a strong argument could be made that the decision in
Valentine is not the cornerstone of the New Deal settlement that
scholars such as Professors Jackson and Jeffries have suggested
it is. Rather, Valentine reflects the much narrower and more rationalistic view of the democratic public sphere that characterized
the pre–New Deal case law, and that led courts to deny constitutional protection not only to commercial advertising but to plays
and movies as well.222 It is certainly the case that the distinction
216 See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42
Case W Res L Rev 411, 467–68 (1992).
217 See Wernick, Promotional Culture at 42–43 (cited in note 211).
218 See Eberle, 42 Case W Res L Rev at 458 (cited in note 216).
219 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 762.
220 See Bellotti, 435 US at 776.
221 Valentine, 316 US at 54.
222 See, for example, Mutual Film Corp, 236 US at 244–45 (denying constitutional
protection to movies on the ground that they are mere “spectacles” rather than “part of
the press of the country or [ ] organs of public opinion”). See also John Wertheimer, Mutual
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the Valentine Court drew—between speech that “communicat[es]
information and disseminat[es] opinion” and “commercial advertising”—was not a novel invention but a feature of the case law
that was at that point many decades old.223
This suggests that in overruling Valentine, the Court did not
break with the principles of the modern free speech tradition. It
merely ensured that they applied more consistently.224
This does not mean, of course, that those principles are correct. One might think, just as Hamilton and Braden or Justice
Frankfurter thought, that the New Deal Court interpreted the
First Amendment more expansively than democratic principles
can justify when it invalidated regulations of speech that were not
patently unreasonable—and that, for that reason, decisions such
as Winters, Joseph Burstyn, and Virginia Pharmacy were wrongly
decided (even perhaps Lochnerian).
If one believes, however, in the premise of the modern constitutional system—namely, that courts can and should play an active role in defending the institutions of democratic government
against what Justice Louis Brandeis called “the occasional tyrannies of [ ] majorities”225—then it proves extremely difficult to explain why courts should rigorously scrutinize the laws regulating
movies and magazines or, for that matter, political speech, but
not laws regulating commercial advertising. The fact that they
are a product of commercial motives obviously impacts what commercial advertisements say and how they say it, but it also means
that ads penetrate where more self-consciously political or artistic
genres of expression may not.226
Film Reviewed: The Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in Progressive America, 37 Am
J Legal Hist 158, 161–70 (1993) (discussing the lack of constitutional protection for plays
as well as movies).
223 Valentine, 316 US at 54. For earlier cases that relied on this distinction, see
Coughlin v Sullivan, 126 A 177, 177 (NJ 1924); People v Johnson, 191 NYS 750, 751 (Gen
Sess 1921); Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co, 50 SE 68, 80 (Ga 1905).
224 It was not the only decision in which the Court did so. Virginia Pharmacy can be
understood as only one in a series of decisions that the Court handed down over the course
of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in which it revised its earlier, unduly narrow, judgment of
what kinds of speech contribute to the “unfettered interchange of ideas” that the First
Amendment protects. See, for example, Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484, 487–89
(1957) (extending constitutional protection to sexually explicit but not prurient speech);
New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 288, 292 (1964) (extending protection to negligent defamatory falsehoods about public officials); Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 21
(1971) (extending protection to profanity).
225 Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis concurring).
226 See Williams, Advertising: The Magic System at 184–85 (cited in note 212):
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The result is that laws that restrict the dissemination of commercial advertisements, or limit what they can say, may pose as
great a threat to the vitality of the democratic public sphere as
movie censorship laws or other repressive speech regulations.227
Consider in this respect a law (enacted, say, in 1953) that, in order to preserve “social order,” banned the public circulation of any
commercial ad that included images of white and black people interacting in an intimate manner. Surely we would all recognize
such a law as political, in its aims and effects, even if the speech
it regulated was purely commercial? And surely we would all recognize that one of the effects of such a law would be to burden
civil rights activists who wished to use commercial advertising to
subvert prevailing segregationist social norms?228
This suggests that the New Deal Court was correct when it
insisted that, if the First Amendment is to protect the “unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social

Advertising is . . . in a sense, the official art of modern capitalist society: it is
what “we” put up in “our” streets and use to fill up to half of “our” newspapers
and magazines: and it commands the services of perhaps the largest organized
body of writers and artists, with their attendant managers and advisers, in the
whole society.
227 This point should not be overstated. The commercial motives of advertisers tend
to make them rather conservative in their messaging, as many have noted. Hence, laws
that restrict the content of commercial ads will be less likely to prevent truly novel or
heterodox ideas from entering the public sphere than laws that restrict the content of arthouse movies or plays. On the other hand, the fact that ads are such a pervasive feature
of the modern public sphere means that they may possess more power than other genres
of expression to normalize contested ideas and beliefs. This explains why both individuals
and groups seeking to promote particular, contested social values tend to pay a great deal
of attention to the content of commercial ads. They obviously recognize the political power
of the genre. See, for example, Devour Succumbs to Tasteless Advertising (American Family Association, Sept 12, 2016), archived at https://www.perma.cc/V96V-8N8U; Tovia
Smith, Backlash Erupts After Gillette Launches a New #MeToo-Inspired Ad Campaign
(NPR, Jan 17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Y6GL-2EFX.
228 Civil rights activists indeed tried to do just that. To give only one example: in 1963,
members of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) attempted to get the Coca-Cola Company to include images of white and black people sharing a Coke in its advertisements.
Hymson, Coca-Cola at *231 (cited in note 208). The attempt was only partially successful.
Coca-Cola’s president, Paul Austin, agreed to include integrated images in Coca-Cola ads
that ran in Ebony magazine but refused to do so in magazines that appealed to a primarily
white audience because he feared backlash from Coke’s southern white consumers. Id at
*231–32. To appease CORE, Austin proposed running ads in these magazines that included images of both white and black people drinking Coke, but not at the same table. Id.
The incident nevertheless suggests that the CORE activists recognized that Coca-Cola
advertising represented an important site for the representation—and perhaps reconfiguration—of ideas of race, equality, and community.
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changes desired by the people,”229 it must apply not only to expressly political speech but also to crassly commercial speech, like
the true crime magazines in Winters, not despite but in some respects because of its power to entertain, distract, and seduce. The
Court simply erred in how broadly it understood this principle to
apply.
Some have argued that even if this is true—even if the First
Amendment should be interpreted to extend some protection to
commercial advertising and to other kinds of commercially oriented speech—commercial speech nevertheless is entitled to only
a lesser degree of protection than other kinds of speech because
of its commercial orientation. Professors Robert Post and Amanda
Shanor recently argued, for example, that the same rules that apply in political and artistic speech cases should not apply in cases
involving commercial advertising because advertisers, when they
speak, “are not participating in democratic self-determination
[but] are instead transacting business in the marketplace.”230 Others have argued that lesser protection for commercial advertising
is necessary to ensure that the government can effectively regulate the marketplace. Justice Rehnquist made this argument in
his dissent in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York,231 and numerous First Amendment
scholars have made similar arguments in recent years to criticize
the strength of the protection courts today provide to commercial
advertising and advertisers.232
It is far from obvious, however, why the commercial orientation of commercial ads—or for that matter, corporate expression—should fundamentally alter the constitutional calculus in

229

Roth, 354 US at 484.
Post and Shanor, 128 Harv L Rev F at 171–72 (cited in note 2).
231 447 US 557 (1980).
232 See, for example, id at 595–99 (Rehnquist dissenting); Shanor, 2016 Wis L Rev at
146, 150 (cited in note 122) (arguing that the state may regulate commercial speech more
extensively than other kinds of speech due to its “subordinate [constitutional] status and
[the fact that] it is not a speaker-oriented autonomy right” but that the Supreme Court’s
recent advertising cases “undermin[e] the [doctrinal] features that the Court that created
the [commercial speech] doctrine put in place to ensure that the First Amendment would
not be the undoing of the regulatory state”); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 L & Contemp Probs 195, 203 (Issue 4, 2014) (arguing that the recent commercial and corporate speech cases represent “the Court’s march
away from a principle that it accepted with the New Deal: [b]uying and selling enjoy no
special constitutional status, and legislatures can regulate markets and businesses to
make life more equitable, safe, or healthful”).
230
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free speech cases. For one thing, it simply is not true that advertisers are the only constitutionally protected speakers who speak
in order to “transact[ ] business in the marketplace” rather than
to “participat[e] in democratic self-determination.” The same is
obviously true of video game manufacturers, Hollywood producers, and true crime magazine publishers. Indeed, the pervasiveness of these kinds of business motives among those who engage
in public expression is a predictable consequence of the fact that
the “free trade in ideas”233 that the First Amendment protects
tends (like most important activities in our capitalist society) to
be organized around market principles and to involve the buying
and selling of goods. As a result, most of the politically or culturally important speech that circulates in public either takes a commodified form or occurs on a commodified platform.
Accordingly, if all those who engaged in speech in order to
make money rather than to contribute to the formation of democratic public opinion were denied protection, except when they
communicated “accurate information to the public”—as Post and
Shanor argue should be the rule for advertising234—the result
would be a tremendously narrower and weaker First Amendment. After all, as the previous discussion makes clear, a tremendous amount of important political expression can take place via
speech that neither communicates accurate factual information
nor is intended to contribute to democratic political debates.
Even leaving aside the problematic effects that a principled
application of such a rule would have on the efficacy of the First
Amendment as a safeguard of the democratic public sphere, it is
not at all clear why it should matter, constitutionally, whether a
speaker engages in public speech in order to contribute to the
democratic process of self-government or in order to make hard
cash. What the modern First Amendment protects is not, after all,
simply the right of citizens to self-consciously participate in processes of democratic self-representation. What it protects and, as
I suggested earlier, has always protected, is the right of the public
to access “the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources.”235 Unless speech that is motivated by profit has nothing to contribute to public debate—and
233

Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting).
Post and Shanor, 128 Harv L Rev F at 173, 177 (cited in note 2) (“Judicial review
of regulations that constrain commercial speech should be focused primarily on the question of whether they unduly restrict the flow of reliable information to the public.”).
235 Associated Press, 326 US at 20.
234
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this is, as I have shown, obviously not the case—the degree of
protection that speech receives cannot rest on the purity of the
speaker’s motives.
Nor is there any reason to think that advertising and corporate speech need to be considered second-class or “subordinate”
kinds of protected speech to enable the government to regulate
the market effectively. Advertising is a profit-oriented genre of
expression, certainly, but so too are the movie business, the television business, the book industry, and virtually all the other mediums of mass communication that the First Amendment today
protects. And yet the fact that these kinds of speech are considered fully protected does not mean, and has never meant, that the
government cannot regulate the conditions of their production,
the terms on which they are sold, and in limited respects,
their content, in order “to make life more equitable, safe, or
healthful.”236
This is not to say that the vigorous protection that courts
have in recent years extended to commercial advertising and to
other kinds of commercially oriented speech has not made it
harder for the government to regulate the market. It certainly
has. It has, for example, made it much more difficult for legislatures to shape consumer behavior by using what Justice
Blackmun described in Virginia Pharmacy as “highly paternalistic” speech regulations.237 This can pose a significant obstacle to
legislatures that want to reduce teen smoking by limiting cigarette advertising.238

236

Purdy, 77 L & Contemp Probs at 203 (cited in note 232).
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 770.
238 Notwithstanding Justice Blackmun’s absolutist language, courts have not found
the antipaternalism principle to totally foreclose laws of this sort. See, for example, Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc v United States, 674 F3d 509, 518 (6th Cir 2012) (upholding significant portions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
against a constitutional challenge); National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc v City of
Providence, 731 F3d 71, 74 (1st Cir 2013) (upholding city ordinances designed to limit the
marketing and sale of cigarettes to minors against a First Amendment challenge). Even
the Court has held that, when it comes to cigarette advertising, “[t]he State’s interest in
preventing underage tobacco use is [not only] substantial . . . [but] compelling.” Lorillard
Tobacco Co v Reilly, 533 US 525, 564 (2001). Nevertheless, the First Amendment antipaternalism principle clearly has made it considerably more difficult for the government to
engage in this kind of market regulation. See, for example, id at 534–35, 564 (striking
down a state ban on cigarette advertising within one thousand feet of a school or playground because it unduly interfered with the ability of “tobacco retailers and manufacturers . . . [to] convey[ ] truthful information about their products to adults, and [the ability
of] adults . . . [to] receiv[e] truthful information about tobacco products”).
237

1298

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1241

The constraint that the commercial advertising cases impose
on the government’s ability to shape consumer behavior by limiting what ads say and how they say it is not, however, different in
kind from the constraint that the movie and magazine and newspaper cases impose on legislative power. The same principle that
makes it difficult for legislatures to restrict cigarette advertising
also makes it difficult for the government to restrict images of
smoking in movies, even when it believes, with good evidence,
that images of smoking in movies help glamorize the consumption
of a very dangerous and addictive product, and even when cigarette companies, fueled by the pursuit of profit, spend considerable sums of money playing those images in the movies.239 It is a
mistake to conceive of the first law as economic regulation and
the second as something else. In both cases, the modern free
speech tradition intrudes upon the government’s power to shape
consumer behavior; in both cases, it does so for democratic ends.
There is no reason to think that the trade-off the First Amendment requires is worse in the first case than in the second, even
if it may have to be made more frequently, given the sheer volume
of commercial ads.
This does not mean that courts need to apply precisely the
same rules in cases involving free speech challenges to commercial ads, or corporate speech, as they apply in cases involving free
speech challenges to other kinds of protected speech. There are,
as I explore in more detail in the next Part, specific features of
commercial advertising that justify the somewhat different rules
courts have traditionally applied in commercial speech cases, and
continue to apply today. For the most part, however, these distinctive features of advertising regulation have nothing to do with
the fact that advertising is motivated by commercial aims.
Nor should the preceding discussion be interpreted to mean
that the trade-offs that the contemporary commercial advertising
and corporate speech cases make between the relevant regulatory
and democratic interests are in all cases good ones. There is good
reason to believe, as I show in the next Part, that many of the
trade-offs the recent cases make are bad: that the contemporary
commercial and corporate speech jurisprudence tends to
overvalue the interest of speaker autonomy and undervalue the
239 It may be the case that the cigarette companies no longer do this, but at one point
the companies spent large sums of money paying movie studios to depict smoking in their
films. See Simon Chapman and Ronald M. Davis, Smoking in Movies: Is It a Problem?, 6
Tobacco Control 269, 269 (1997).
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interests promoted by government regulation. Critics are correct,
in other words, to be concerned about the powerful deregulatory
effects of recent commercial and corporate speech decisions like
Citizens United and Sorrell.
What the preceding discussion does mean, however, is that
these (very serious) problems with contemporary free speech law
cannot be blamed on what Morgan Weiland calls the “outward
creep” of the First Amendment—namely, its expansion to include
commercially oriented speech like advertising, and to protect
commercial speakers like corporations.240 Nor can they be blamed
on courts’ more recent tendency to treat commercial advertising
and corporate speech as equal in value to other, less obviously
commercial, kinds of speech. Nor, for that matter, are they an inevitable consequence of the intrinsically libertarian tendencies
of the modern free speech tradition, as some have recently
suggested.241
Instead, as the next Part demonstrates, the economically deregulatory tendencies of contemporary free speech law are the
product of changes in how the Court—and consequently, lower
courts—have come to understand the free speech right over the
past four decades. These changes in the judicial conception of
what it means to possess freedom of speech have been profound—
their impact has, as I show, extended far beyond just the advertising and corporate speech cases. Nevertheless, it is these
changes in what courts understand freedom of speech to mean,
rather than in their understanding of how broadly it applies, that
best explains what is wrong with the holdings in Citizens United
and Sorrell.
By focusing on the extension of First Amendment protection
to advertising and corporate speech, scholars miss the far more
consequential, and in fact, far more radical, changes that have
taken place in free speech jurisprudence over the past forty
years—changes that have reshaped, and continue to reshape

240

Weiland, 69 Stan L Rev at 1423 (cited in note 121).
See Kessler, 116 Colum L Rev at 1922, 1925 (cited in note 135) (arguing that “economically libertarian tendencies [ ] may be intrinsic to judicial enforcement of civil liberties, regardless of the politics of individual judges,” and arguing as a result that reformers
should “break with a legal tradition long insensitive to the deleterious impact of judicial
civil libertarianism on political regulation of the economy”); Louis Michael Seidman, Can
Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 Colum L Rev 2219, 2232–33 (2018) (arguing that “First
Amendment theory rests on libertarian assumptions at war with progressivism” and that
“the holding of Citizens United was also more or less inevitable”).
241
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many areas of free speech law besides the commercial and corporate speech cases. To see why, it is necessary to revisit one more
time the early twentieth-century debates about Lochner’s ills, and
what it means to enforce constitutional rights in a society characterized then as now by significant inequality.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE GENEALOGY
As I noted in Part I, in the first few decades of the twentieth
century, critics provided many different explanations for why
Lochner, and the other decisions in which the Supreme Court invalidated labor laws on freedom of contract grounds, got it wrong.
One of the explanations they provided was the Thayerian argument that Justice Holmes made in his Lochner dissent. But another, in fact far more common, explanation for why the freedom
of contract cases were incorrectly decided was that they relied
upon an unrealistic and out-of-date conception of the modern industrial workplace, and the circumstances under which labor contracts were actually forged.
Scholars, including such respected figures as Professors
Roscoe Pound and Robert Eugene Cushman, criticized the courts
for producing a jurisprudence that failed to take adequate “cognizance . . . of the realities of modern life.”242 They argued that the
overly “mechanical and legalistic” approach that courts took when
deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases prevented them from “effective[ly] [ ] investigat[ing] or consider[ing] [ ] the situations of
fact behind or bearing upon the statutes” they analyzed, and led
them to rely upon a nostalgic, and incorrect, view of contracting—
one which was ignorant of, or willfully blind to, the very significant economic pressures that prevented workers from making
meaningful choices about where and under what conditions to
contract.243 Ultimately, it was courts’ inability to grasp the economic and social reality of the modern workplace, these critics
argued, that produced “rules and decisions which, tested by their
practical operation, defeat[ed] liberty” rather than enhanced it.244

242 Robert Eugene Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 Mich L Rev 737, 750–51 (1922). See also Pound, 18 Yale L J at 454–
55 (cited in note 11); Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 Harv L Rev 943, 960 (1927); Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 Harv L Rev 6,
7–8 (1924); Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 Ill L Rev 461, 463, 467 (1916).
243 Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner at 44–45 (cited in note 30).
244 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum L Rev 605, 616 (1908).
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Critics provided a number of explanations for why courts paid
such insufficient attention to the economic conditions under
which workers exercised their freedom of contract. They blamed
it on the class biases of judges,245 the inadequacies of legal education (which, Pound argued, focused too much on philosophical argument and too little on the sociological analysis of law),246 and
the very formalistic character of legal reasoning at the time.247
In fact, we can attribute the failure of Lochner-era courts to
adequately account for the “realities of modern life” almost entirely to the strong public/private distinction they relied upon to
delimit the scope of constitutional rights. As Professor Joseph
William Singer and others have demonstrated, a foundational assumption of constitutional doctrine during this period was that
there were two spheres of activity that could be strictly separated—a “private sphere of individual contractual freedom [and]
the public sphere of government regulation”—and that the Constitution protected individual liberty only against the latter.248

245 See Cushman, 20 Mich L Rev at 748 (cited in note 242); Eaton S. Drone, The Power
of the Supreme Court, 8 Forum 653, 657 (1890) (“Consciously or unconsciously, honestly
or otherwise, judges on the supreme bench have been controlled or influenced by their
political beliefs, by partisan bias, by public sentiment . . . , [and by] the theories of the
party with which they have acted or may sympathize.”).
246 Pound, 18 Yale L J at 457 (cited in note 11). See also Brandeis, 10 Ill L Rev at 470
(cited in note 242):

[J]udge[s] came to the bench unequipped with the necessary knowledge of economic and social science, and [their] judgment suffered likewise through lack of
equipment in the lawyers who presented the cases to [them]. . . . It is not surprising that under such conditions the laws as administered failed to meet contemporary economic and social demands.
247 See Pound, 18 Yale L J at 457 (cited in note 11) (identifying as a source of the
problems with the freedom of contract cases the dominance of a “mechanical jurisprudence
. . . in which deduction from conceptions has produced a cloud of rules that obscures the
principles from which they were drawn, in which conceptions are developed logically at
the expense of practical results and in which the artificiality characteristic of legal reasoning is exaggerated”); Biklé, 38 Harv L Rev at 12 (cited in note 242) (“It seems clear that
a substantial part of the criticism which [the Court’s due process cases] aroused was due
to the Court’s undertaking to decide for the country the controlling questions of fact on the
basis of a priori reasoning.”).
248 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal L Rev 465, 478 (1988). See also
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal L Rev 1151, 1196–1204 (1985) (citation omitted):

The representational practice of the liberty of contract era assumed that the social world was divisible into “public” and “private” spheres of action, implicitly
corresponding to the “presence” or “absence” of the individual’s free will. When
conduct was “purely” private, an expression of the autonomous free will of the
affected parties, there was no basis for the imposition of legislative power.
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What this meant in practice was that courts construed the Constitution to protect individuals against constraints on their liberty that were the intended result of government regulation of the
private sphere, but refused to construe the Constitution to protect
individuals against constraints on their liberty that were the
product of private decision-making—even private decisionmaking that was enforced by means of the legal mechanisms of
tort, contract, and property law.249 To the contrary: courts insisted
that what the Constitution guaranteed was the freedom of private
individuals to decide the terms of their relationships with one another and to enforce those decisions, if necessary, by using the
courts.250 Hence, they interpreted the Constitution to allow the
government to intrude upon this realm of private ordering only
when doing so was necessary to advance a limited number of important purposes—most of which had to do with protecting the
system of private ordering itself or safeguarding the welfare of
the community as a whole.251
The sharp divide that courts drew in this period between the
public and the private realms helps explain their strong antipathy toward “class legislation”—to legislation, that is, that restricts a constitutionally protected liberty or property right of
some private citizens in order to protect the constitutionally protected liberty or property of others.252 After all, if what the Constitution guarantees is a private sphere in which individuals can
negotiate their relationships for themselves, efforts by the government to reorder the terms of those relationships are obviously
illegitimate, at least so long as those subject to the regulation are

249

See Peller, 73 Cal L Rev at 1202 (cited in note 248):

Private law generally was conceived as the realm where the judiciary carried out
the prior intentions of social actors. . . . In private law, the judiciary was conceived as a neutral mediator for the enforcement of individual intent, just as in
constitutional law legislative power was limited to the neutral public interest.
250 See Singer, 76 Cal L Rev at 479 (cited in note 248) (“Freedom of contract meant
that the parties were free to make or not make contracts, and that when they made contracts the courts would enforce the terms to which the parties had agreed.”).
251 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 877 (cited in note 5) (noting that an “especially
distinctive” feature of the Lochner Court’s approach was its “sharp limitation of the category of permissible government ends” and insistence that “[e]fforts to redistribute resources and paternalistic measures were both constitutionally out of bounds”); Gillman,
Constitution Besieged at 97–98 (cited in note 26) (describing the requirement that government intervention into the public sphere should benefit the public as a whole); Singer, 76
Cal L Rev at 479 (cited in note 248) (noting that contracts could not be enforced if “there
was a defect in free will, such as fraud, duress, or incapacity”).
252 Peller, 73 Cal L Rev at 1198 (cited in note 248).
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autonomous actors, capable of exercising their constitutional
rights on their own behalf.253
Courts’ assumption during this period that what the Constitution guarantees is a private sphere of freedom from government
control—and one organized, in large part, via the mechanisms of
the private market—also helps explain why, notwithstanding the
cries of formalism, courts were willing to pay attention to certain
kinds of facts—for example, to the extraordinary physical dangers
that workers in specific industries faced—but refused, for the
most part, to integrate into their constitutional analysis any consideration of the economic and social facts that realist critics
wanted them to.254 A constitutional doctrine that allows the government to limit freedom of contract when necessary to protect
workers against particularly hazardous working conditions does
not appear to pose an existential threat to the independence of
the private market. But a constitutional doctrine that allows the
government to limit freedom of contract whenever necessary to
correct for inequalities in economic and social power does—at
least if one assumes, as the Court clearly assumed, that inequality of this kind is a natural and inevitable result of a market system.255 Hence, although courts on occasion acknowledged the economic constraints that workers in concentrated industries faced
when making decisions about when and how to sell their labor,
for the most part they left out of their analysis any consideration
of how economic inequalities affected freedom of contract, or any

253 As Cushman noted, courts allowed legislatures to protect persons who were “infants, lunatics, wards, or [ ] under some other definite legal disability” against private
exploitation and abuse. Cushman, 20 Mich L Rev at 748 (cited in note 242). But it did not
allow the legislature to do the same with respect to workers, like the bakers in Lochner,
who possessed ordinary “intelligence and capacity.” Lochner, 198 US at 57.
254 See, for example, Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366, 393–98 (1898) (examining in some
detail the peculiar dangers faced by laborers in underground mines and upholding a
maximum-hours statute for them); Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412, 421–23 (1908) (examining in some detail the effects of extended labor on women’s “physical structure and the
performance of maternal functions” and upholding a maximum-hours law, and concluding
that a maximum-hours law that applied only to female laborers was constitutionally permissible because it was “not imposed solely for [the] benefit [of the workers] but also
largely for the benefit of all”).
255 As the Court declared in Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1 (1915), “[I]t is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are
the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.” Id at 17.
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of the other freedoms that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed.256 Doing so was simply too threatening to the doctrinal
status quo.
Rather than an oversight, or the consequence of an inadequate legal education, we can thus understand the economically
insensitive character of constitutional law during the Lochner era
as the predictable result of a jurisprudence that insisted on construing constitutional rights as largely negative autonomy
rights—as rights that entitled the individual to freedom from governmental regulation, but not rights that entitled the individual
to anything more positive (such as a meaningful choice about
where and how to contract).
The result was, nevertheless, a body of law that appeared increasingly out of touch with the modern world—one that insisted
on treating as a sphere of freedom what appeared to many exactly
the opposite. It was the sharp divide between legal doctrine and
social reality that ultimately produced the crisis of legitimacy
that resulted in the New Deal revolution. As Professor
Barry Friedman notes, it was “because the Lochner-era judges engaged in formalist legal reasoning, without attention to the felt
necessities of the time, that they earned the contempt of their
contemporaries.”257
This helps explain why, when the New Deal Court finally
broke with Lochner-era jurisprudence, it did so by rejecting the
sharp distinction between the public and private realms on which
it had previously relied. The Court made as much clear in its landmark decision in West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish,258 in 1937, when
it declared that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause

256 In Holden, for example, the Court acknowledged that workers in mines and their
employers “do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a certain extent,
conflicting” and concluded that “[i]n such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and
the legislature may properly interpose its authority.” Holden, 169 US at 397. It made clear,
however, that this inequality justified legislative intervention only when the work the laborers performed was particularly hazardous. Id at 396:

While the general experience of mankind may justify us in believing that men
may engage in ordinary employments more than eight hours per day without
injury to their health, it does not follow that labor for the same length of time is
innocuous when carried on beneath the surface of the earth, where the operative
is deprived of fresh air and sunlight, and is frequently subjected to foul atmosphere and a very high temperature, or to the influence of noxious gases, generated by the processes of refining or smelting.
257
258

Friedman, 76 NYU L Rev at 1388 (cited in note 29).
300 US 379 (1937).
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was a “liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people” and made clear that one of these
evils which menaced the welfare of the people was the evil created
by the private “exploitation of a class of workers who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power.”259 In National
Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,260 the
Court similarly insisted that the right of employees to collectively
organize had to be recognized as a “fundamental right” given the
unequal bargaining power that existed between employer and
employee.261
Professor Edward Corwin, in an article published in The New
Republic just a few months later, argued that these decisions
were revolutionary because they recognized something that earlier decisions had not: namely, that “‘liberty’ is . . . something that
may be infringed by other forces as well as by those of government;
indeed, something that may require the positive intervention of
government against those other forces.”262 The Court’s recognition
of this fact, Corwin argued, “mark[ed] a development of profound
significance in our constitutional history.”263
In fact, the Court’s recognition that private action could result
in a denial of constitutional rights would prove less revolutionary
than Corwin may have anticipated—at least when it came to its
freedom of contract cases—due to the fact that, a few years after
West Coast Hotel was handed down, the Court effectively deconstitutionalized the entire area of law. The significant deference the
Court gave the legislature when it came to decisions that implicated freedom of contract rendered its understanding of what that
freedom meant largely irrelevant to the disposition of cases, or to
the operation of governmental power writ large.264

259

Id at 391, 399.
301 US 1 (1937).
261 Id at 33.
262 Edward S. Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light (The New Republic, Aug 4, 1937),
archived at https://perma.cc/2YH3-F73N.
263 Id.
264 As Professor Jack Balkin notes, “West Coast Hotel could have been seen as the clarion call for a new doctrine of substantive economic justice, where economic rights were
based not upon parameters derived from the common law but from evolving notions of economic fairness.” Balkin, 83 Nw U L Rev at 295 (cited in note 48). Instead, it became merely
a pit stop on the way to Carolene Products. See id at 296.
260
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In other areas of law, however—for example, its First Amendment cases—the Court continued to play an active role in enforcing constitutional limits on state action. It was in this context,
then, that the New Deal Court’s “revolutionary” approach to the
interpretation of constitutional liberties—and more specifically,
its sensitivity to the threat that private economic power posed to
constitutionally protected liberty—made itself felt.
A. The Public and Private Divide in the New Deal Cases
Consider in this respect the Court’s 1945 decision in
Associated Press v United States.265 The case involved a First
Amendment challenge to a district court opinion that found that
the Associated Press violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when it
enacted bylaws that prevented its member newspapers from selling news to nonmember newspapers and allowed member newspapers to block competitors from membership.266 The district
court enjoined the AP from enforcing these bylaws and the AP
appealed.267 It argued that the injunction violated the First
Amendment rights of both it and its members by requiring them
to accept into the association, and to share news with, newspapers
in whose pages they did not want their articles to appear.268 The
government, for its part, argued that this restriction on the freedom of AP newspapers was justified by the government’s “vital”
interest in ensuring “the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is
possible.”269
The case thus posed essentially the same question as that
posed in Lochner: Could the government restrict the constitutionally protected freedom of powerful private actors (bakery owners,
members of the AP) in order to protect the constitutionally protected freedom of less powerful others (bakers, those excluded
from membership in the AP, the reading public)? But if in
265

326 US 1 (1945).
Id at 4, 19.
267 See United States v Associated Press, 52 F Supp 362, 375 (SDNY 1943).
268 Reply Brief for Tribune Company and Robert Rutherford McCormick, Associated
Press v United States, Nos 57, 58, 59, *19 (US filed Nov 13, 1944) (available on Westlaw
at 1944 WL 42540) (arguing that if the Sherman Act is enforced as the lower court dictated, “AP must admit to membership and therefore ‘utter’ its news dispatches to every
applicant newspaper” and that “no ‘clear and present danger’ justifies such a compulsive
decree”).
269 Brief for the United States, Associated Press v United States, Nos 57, 58, 59, *91
(US filed Nov 1944) (available on Westlaw at 1944 WL 42539).
266
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Lochner, the Court answered this question with a resounding no,
in Associated Press the Court reached the opposite conclusion. It
upheld the district court’s injunction because it recognized that
even if there was no difference in the “intelligence and capacity”
of those included and those excluded from the organization, their
economic circumstances were not the same. Because it was extremely difficult for nonmember newspapers to, as the Court put
it, “g[et] along without AP news,” members of the AP possessed
the economic if not the legal power to make it much more difficult
for competitor newspapers to exercise their freedom of press.270
This meant, the Court concluded, that it was constitutionally permissible for the government to limit the AP’s ability to exclude
newspapers from its organization and to prevent the sharing of
members’ news.271 “It would be strange indeed,” Justice Black
wrote in his majority opinion, “if the grave concern for freedom of
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment
should be read as a command that the government was without
power to protect that freedom.”272 He went on:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a
free society. Surely a command that the government itself
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford nongovernmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. . . .
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests.273
As this passage makes clear, the Associated Press Court recognized what the Lochner Court had not: namely, that private
economic power could limit the exercise of constitutional rights
just as government coercion could, and that government intervention into the private sphere could consequently protect, not
merely threaten, constitutional liberty. As a result, in this and
270
271
272
273

Associated Press, 326 US at 17–18.
Id at 21–22.
Id at 20.
Id.

1308

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1241

other decisions, it refused to invalidate laws like the Sherman
Antitrust Act that limited the freedom of media producers but did
so in order to promote a more “diverse and antagonistic” public
sphere.274 To the contrary: it interpreted those laws as not only
constitutionally permissible but as means by which the legislature in its own right furthered First Amendment values.
Nor did the Court limit itself to affirming the constitutionality of legislative interventions of this sort into the private sphere.
In contexts where either the legislative or executive branches did
not do enough to safeguard diverse and inclusive participation in
public debate, the Court did so itself, by interpreting the First
Amendment to require positive rights of access to important public spaces. In what would come to be known as its public forum
cases, for example, the Court rejected the Lochner-era rule that
categorically denied constitutional protection to speakers who
were excluded from publicly owned land.275 It held instead that,
when it comes to parks, streets, and sidewalks, the government
not only has to grant speakers rights of access to those spaces, but
also had to bear the costs of their speech—including the security
costs that offensive or otherwise unpopular speakers could create.276 In Marsh v Alabama,277 the Court extended essentially the
same rule to private property owners who sought to exclude
speakers from privately owned streets, parks, and sidewalks.278
In these and other cases, the New Deal Court effectively rejected the idea that what the First Amendment guarantees is no

274 For other examples of the government’s intervention into the private sphere on
similar grounds, see National Broadcasting Co v United States, 319 US 190, 216–19
(1943); Associated Press, 301 US at 123–24.
275 See Davis v Massachusetts, 167 US 43, 47–48 (1897). This rule reflected the more
general view that prevailed during this period that when the government acted within the
system of private ordering, rather than regulating the terms on which it occurred—when
it exercised, in other words, the same powers as property owner or employer that private
individuals possessed—no constitutional constraints applied. (In such cases, courts regarded the government action as part of the “private,” rather than public sphere of activity, and immune as a result from constitutional scrutiny.) As Justice Holmes put it in his
majority opinion in Ellis v United States, 206 US 246 (1907), “The Government purely as
contractor, in the absence of special laws, may stand like a private person.” Id at 256. See
also Davis, 167 US at 47 (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”).
276 See Terminiello v City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949); Schneider, 308 US at 163;
Hague v Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 US 496, 515–16 (1939); Lovell v City
of Griffin, 303 US 444, 450 (1938).
277 326 US 501 (1946).
278 Id at 507–08.
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more and no less than a sphere of negative liberty. It insisted instead that the First Amendment granted individuals something
more positive: namely, some right to access, either as speaker or
as listener, the “uncensored” “channels of communication” that
citizens needed in order to effectively exercise their democratic
role.279 It insisted, furthermore, that the constitutional interest in
facilitating this kind of positive liberty trumped the right of both
public and private property owners to control the uses to which
their property was put.280
The result was a body of law that did not, as Hamilton and
Braden suggested in their 1941 article, simply replicate in new
form Lochner-era due process jurisprudence. Both bodies of constitutional law, it is true, vested judges with considerable power
to strike down democratically enacted laws and had, as a result,
a considerable deregulatory effect. Nevertheless, their deregulatory effects were quite different. If in the earlier period, the Court
had interpreted the Due Process Clause as a limit on the government’s ability to alter the existing balance of economic and political power by restricting the freedom of the powerful and the propertied, now the Court interpreted the First Amendment as a limit
on the government’s ability to shore up the existing balance of
power by, among other things, enforcing the traditional right of
property owners to exclude, when doing so made it significantly
more difficult for some to participate in public debate. Put differently, if Lochner due process jurisprudence rendered many kinds
of redistribution constitutionally impermissible, the New Deal
Court’s free speech jurisprudence rendered certain kinds of redistribution constitutionally obligatory—or at least, constitutionally
permissible.
There were limits to how much the Court was willing to constrain either government or private power in order to promote a

279
280

Id.
See id at 509:

In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the
deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the
public, is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern
a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.
See also Hague, 307 US at 515 (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).
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more diverse and more inclusive public sphere. For one thing, neither in Associated Press nor in any other decision did the Court
hold that the legislature was constitutionally required to ensure
that powerful speakers did not use their economic muscle to shut
others up, even if this is the conclusion that the logic of the opinion might suggest. The Court also did not interpret the First
Amendment to require all property owners to grant access to their
property for those who wanted to speak on matters of public concern. It merely required rights of access to sufficiently important
public places.281 The Court also allowed the government, in some
cases at least, to make rules for the regulation of the public sphere
that imposed a disparate burden on the ability of those with few
economic resources to make their voices publicly heard. In Kovacs
v Cooper,282 for example, a bitterly divided Court upheld a law
that banned the public use of “loud and raucous” loudspeakers
attached to cars,283 even though, as Justice Black pointed out in
his impassioned dissent, the law made it considerably harder for
“people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but who do
not have enough money to own or control publishing plants, newspapers, radios, [or] moving picture[s]” to do so.284 The Court concluded that, because the law served important government aims
and because it left open alternative means for those it affected to
communicate their message, it was constitutionally permissible.285

281 Professor Mike Seidman has argued that the Court ultimately turned away from
what he calls “Marsh-style reasoning” because the logic of the decision was impossible to
reconcile with the New Deal settlement. Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U Chi L Rev 1541, 1549, 1550–51 (2008)
(citation omitted):

Taken to the limits of its logic, Marsh constitutionalizes virtually all of public
policy. Every decision concerning the allocation of property rights has implications for the total amount of speech society produces. Hence, all such decisions
become constitutionally mandatory and, therefore, outside the sphere open to
political control. . . . Of course, this outcome was unacceptable. The liberals on
the Court attempted to avoid it by deconstitutionalizing “neutral” background
property law entitlements.
But in fact, Justice Black’s opinion in Marsh made quite clear that judicial override of
legislative property allocations was required only in a limited number of cases. Marsh, 326
US at 506. Nothing in Marsh therefore requires, or even hints at the possibility, that property law might be thoroughly constitutionalized, and therefore placed outside the sphere
open to political control.
282 336 US 77 (1949).
283 Id at 89 (Reed) (plurality).
284 Id at 102 (Black dissenting).
285 Id at 89 (Reed) (plurality).
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The Court did not assume, in other words, that the First
Amendment guaranteed speakers and listeners absolute equality
of opportunity to speak. The Court did assume, however, that the
First Amendment guaranteed speakers and listeners a meaningful opportunity to both speak and listen in important public
places—and that this meant that, in some contexts, the rights of
both public and private property owners had to give way to the
rights of speech.286 Because it interpreted freedom of speech to
mean more than a formal or “abstract” right the speaker held
against the state, it also paid close attention to the economic and
social, as well as legal, forces that limited the exercise of expressive freedom and crafted doctrinal rules that attempted to ensure
that the socially and economically powerless, as well as the socially and economically powerful, had a meaningful opportunity
to speak.287
B. The Burger Court’s Shift
The Court continued to employ this, what we might call “realist,” conception of freedom of speech throughout the 1950s and
1960s. Indeed, a hallmark of the Warren Court’s free speech jurisprudence was its sensitivity to the threat that economic, social,
and political inequality posed to the “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open” public debate that it now understood the First Amendment to safeguard.288 This explains, among other things, the

286 Even the Kovacs plurality took for granted that, were the disparate impact sufficiently grave, the First Amendment would prevent the government from being able to
restrict speech, no matter how legitimate its aim. Kovacs, 336 US at 88–89.
287 See, for example, Terminiello, 337 US at 3–35 (striking down the breach-of-peace
conviction of a speaker who refused to stop speaking after his speech drew a hostile, and
increasingly violent, reaction from its audience because to do otherwise would be to allow
the “standardization of ideas” not only by “legislatures [and] courts” but also by “dominant
political or community groups”); Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 112 (1943) (striking down a license tax that applied to sellers of expressive materials out of concern that it
would impose too onerous a burden on “those who do not have a full purse” and would
prevent “the needy” from being able to engage in religious evangelism).
288 New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964). See also John E. Nowak,
Foreword: Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 Hastings Const
L Q 263, 276, 280 (1980):

The Warren Court’s constitutional rulings . . . [reflected the principle that] government institutions should neither approve nor tolerate the existence of private
interests which seek to produce unfairness and inequality beyond the principles
of the social compact.
...
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Court’s insistence in New York Times Co v Sullivan289 that the
First Amendment protects speakers against not only criminal
statutes or regulatory ordinances but also against civil suits
brought by private parties, and the economic sanctions that result.290 It also explains the Court’s vigorous enforcement of the
rule against hecklers’ vetoes in cases involving civil rights protestors.291 And it explains the decision in Tinker to extend constitutional protection to student speech.292
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, there was a marked
shift in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence away from
the equality-promoting, context-sensitive approach that had
characterized its free speech decisions, more or less, from the
1930s through the late 1960s. The Burger Court, despite the fears
of some critics, proved itself to be a sometimes-aggressive defender of First Amendment freedoms.293 But it interpreted those
freedoms quite differently than had the New Deal and Warren
Courts. Rather than interpreting the First Amendment as a guarantee of expressive freedom that depended on—but nevertheless
sometimes required deviation from—the ordinary rules of property and contract, the Court now increasingly interpreted the
First Amendment as a grant of almost total freedom to the property owner to dictate the expressive uses to which his or her property would be put. The result was a free speech jurisprudence that
The Court’s most famous and innovative [free speech] decisions promoted [the
idea] that the social compact must promote equality and must allow for free
speech on social issues.
289

376 US 254 (1964).
Id at 277–78 (“What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage
awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal
statute.”) (citation omitted).
291 See, for example, Gregory v City of Chicago, 394 US 111, 112–13 (1969); Edwards
v South Carolina, 372 US 229, 237 (1963).
292 Tinker, 393 US at 508–09. Like the earlier opinion in Terminiello, the decision in
Tinker represents the Court’s efforts to ensure that government actors, even when wellmeaning, do not act in a manner that makes government institutions an instrument of the
censorial desires of the majority. Id at 508 (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression . . .
[because a]ny variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.”), citing Terminiello,
337 US 1.
293 See Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw U L Rev 1031, 1031 (1983) (“Perhaps in th[e] area [of
freedom of speech] more than any other, the Burger Court has evinced a relatively protectionist and libertarian attitude, which, though assuredly not applied with unwavering
consistency, occasionally even surpassed the protectionist zeal of the Warren Court.”)
(citation omitted).
290
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was much more “mechanical” and “abstract” in the Poundian
sense of the terms.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the Court’s new understanding of what the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech prohibits or requires was its 1974 decision in Miami
Herald Publishing Co v Tornillo.294 The case involved a First
Amendment challenge to a Florida law that required newspapers
that criticized the character of political candidates to offer those
candidates space in their newspaper to reply.295 Five years earlier,
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co v Federal Communications Commission,296 the Court had upheld FCC regulations that imposed a similar right of reply requirement on radio broadcasters.297 Red Lion
was a controversial decision because it allowed the government to
compel media companies to transmit speech “which their ‘reason’
tells them should not be published” notwithstanding Justice
Black’s suggestion in Associated Press v United States that the
First Amendment did not permit this kind of compulsion.298 The
Red Lion Court upheld the regulations, however, for reasons very
much in keeping with Associated Press—namely, because it found
that they “enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms of
speech and press protected by the First Amendment” by ensuring
that a diversity of viewpoints was heard on the radio notwithstanding the concentration of control over the industry in relatively few hands.299 In this respect, it represented a continuation
of principles the Court had relied upon for over thirty years.
It was quite significant, then, when the Tornillo Court did
not so much overrule Red Lion as reject its entire analytic approach.300 It struck down the Florida right of reply law in Tornillo,
294

418 US 241 (1974).
Id at 244.
296 395 US 367 (1969).
297 Id at 386–401.
298 Associated Press, 326 US at 20 & n 18.
299 Red Lion, 395 US at 375, 391 (concluding that “the First Amendment confers no
right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on ‘their’ frequencies and no right
to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use”).
300 The Tornillo opinion did not mention Red Lion at all. This allowed the Court to
employ a markedly different approach to the constitutional questions raised by right of
reply laws than that employed in Red Lion. But it also meant that the opinion was not
subsequently understood to have overruled Red Lion; instead it merely cabined its reach
to radio and television broadcasting. See Federal Communications Commission v Pacifica
Foundation, 438 US 726, 748 (1978). The Court’s understanding of the decision did change,
however, considerably. In later decisions, the Court asserted that the reason broadcast
295
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even though it recognized that the newspaper industry was
plagued by many of the same problems of concentrated power as
the radio industry.301 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
Warren Burger noted, for example, that because the newspaper
business (like the radio industry) was highly concentrated, “the
power to inform the American people and shape public opinion”
was “place[d] in few hands.”302 Chief Justice Burger noted also
that the problem of concentration could not be easily corrected by
the ordinary processes of market competition, given the steep barriers to entry that existed in the newspaper industry, in Florida
as elsewhere.303 Chief Justice Burger nevertheless insisted that
the First Amendment sharply limited the government’s ability to
do anything about these problems. “A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal,” he wrote, “but press responsibility is
not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it
cannot be legislated.”304
The opinion suggested in fact that any law that limited the
freedom of newspaper editors to decide the size and content of the
newspapers they edited—no matter how small a limitation it imposed—would “fail[ ] to clear the barriers of the First Amendment” because of its intrusion on editorial freedom.305 This would
be the case “[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs
to comply with a compulsory access law,” Chief Justice Burger
wrote, “and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or
opinion by the inclusion of a reply.”306 This is because, he explained, “[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.”307 It is instead the product of “editorial control and judgment.”308 “It has yet to be
demonstrated,” he added, “how governmental regulation of this

media could be heavily regulated was not so much the power that broadcasters enjoyed
due to their control of a scarce expressive resource, but the unique pervasiveness of the
broadcast media in private homes and its accessibility to children. See id at 748–49. A
concern with the economic power that broadcasters possessed, and its effect on the interests that the First Amendment protects, disappeared entirely from the analysis in this, as
in almost all other areas of free speech law.
301 Tornillo, 418 US at 248–49.
302 Id at 250.
303 Id at 251.
304 Id at 256.
305 Tornillo, 418 US at 258.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”309
In an article published the year after Tornillo was handed
down, Professor Kenneth Karst argued that the breadth of the
language in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion reflected the Court’s
desire to not only resolve the case, but also “make a more general
doctrinal statement.”310 If so, that doctrinal statement may have
been that, notwithstanding the many cases in which the Court
had said the opposite, the First Amendment did not in fact guarantee “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources” but instead guaranteed something quite different: namely, a zone of individual liberty, free
from state control. Certainly the opinion’s explicit and quite extended rejection of the idea that courts should take account of
facts such as market concentration or media diversity when assessing the constitutionality of newspaper right of reply laws
strongly suggested that, in this context at least, the Court believed that the First Amendment interest in protecting the expressive autonomy of newspaper editors trumped the First
Amendment interest in ensuring that members of the public had
access to a wide range of views and information.
In portions of his opinion, Chief Justice Burger suggested
that it was by protecting the expressive autonomy of newspaper
editors that the First Amendment ensured, in the long-term, a
diverse, vibrant, and antagonistic public debate.311 The opinion
made clear, however, that even if it didn’t, the government would
still be constitutionally prohibited from interfering with the autonomy of newspaper editors—that the negative right of the
speaker to be free of government interference prevailed over the
positive right of the public to access a meaningfully diverse public
debate.312 And in fact, in other decisions it handed down around
the same time, the Court employed a similarly propertyprotective and anti-redistributive approach to the interpretation
of First Amendment rights, even when doing so could not plausibly be said to advance free speech values.

309

Tornillo, 418 US at 258.
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U
Chi L Rev 20, 50 (1975).
311 Tornillo, 418 US at 257 (arguing that “[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate’”), quoting Sullivan,
376 US at 279.
312 Tornillo, 418 US at 258.
310
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This was true, for example, of the Court’s shopping mall decisions. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc,313 in 1968, the Court held that a state
court could not constitutionally enjoin members of a union from
picketing a store located in a privately owned shopping mall because the mall, like the company town in Marsh, performed an
important public function—in an era of suburbanization, it provided an important site for public expression, as well as commerce.314 This meant, the Court concluded, that the First Amendment prevented mall owners from using state property laws to
exclude objectionable speakers from the property when that
speech was not incompatible with the ordinary uses of the mall.315
In holding as much, the Court did not articulate a new doctrinal
principle but merely extended the logic of Marsh to apply to the
new social realities of late twentieth-century America.
Despite this fact, four years after Logan Valley was handed
down, the Court sharply limited its reach when it held in Lloyd
Corp v Tanner316 that speakers did not have a First Amendment
right to access privately owned shopping malls when their speech
did not relate to the businesses that used the mall.317 Four years
after that, in Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board,318 the
Court went one step further and overruled Logan Valley.319 In neither decision did the Court argue that there was anything wrong
with Logan Valley’s analysis of the sociological importance of
malls to late twentieth-century American public life. Instead, the
Court rejected the idea that this social fact should matter to the
constitutional analysis. The only facts that mattered, the Court
asserted, were facts pertaining to the nature of the invitation the
mall owner issued when he opened his mall up to public use. If
the owner issued an “open-ended invitation to the public to use
[his mall] for any and all purposes,” the Court held, then the mall
could be considered “dedicate[ed] . . . to public use [so] as to entitle
[speakers] to exercise therein . . . First Amendment rights.”320 But
if not, the First Amendment did not grant speakers a right of access to these private spaces. To hold otherwise, the Court insisted,
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320

391 US 308 (1968).
Id at 318, 324–25.
Id at 324–25.
407 US 551 (1972).
Id at 564, 570.
424 US 507 (1976).
Id at 518.
Lloyd Corp, 407 US at 565, 570.
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would be to engage in “an unwarranted infringement of property
rights.”321
Just as it had in Tornillo, the Court held in these cases too
that the autonomy rights of property owners trumped the First
Amendment rights of those who sought access to their property to
speak on matters of public concern. The result was to render almost completely irrelevant to the analysis any consideration of
the effect of the protestors’ exclusion from the mall on their ability
to effectively communicate and, more broadly, to deconstitutionalize the law of private property. It allowed “the formalities of title [to] put an end to analysis,” as Justice Thurgood Marshall put
it in his dissent in Hudgens.322 It resuscitated, in other words, the
much more formal distinction between the public and private
spheres that Lochner-era courts had relied upon.
The Court employed a similarly formalist approach in cases
involving rights of access to government-owned property. Just as
it had during the Lochner era, the Court analogized the rights
that the government enjoyed as property owner to the rights that
a private person enjoyed as property owner, and concluded that
this meant that speakers had virtually no rights of access to government property that didn’t happen to take the form of a park,
street, or sidewalk.323 The Court reaffirmed, in other words, the
priority of property rights over speech rights, even when the property owner happened to be the government and the property happened to be a publicly important space like a military base—or in
later cases, a library, a state fair, or an airport terminal.324
The Court continued to assert that First Amendment rights
of access trumped property rights when it came to publicly owned
streets, parks, and sidewalks.325 Even in those spaces, however,
321

Id at 567.
Hudgens, 424 US at 538–39 (Marshall dissenting).
323 See Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 836–37 (1976) (concluding that because “[t]he
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,” speakers have a constitutional
right of access to government property only when the government “abandon[s] any claim
of special interest in regulating” speech on that property); Jones v North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc, 433 US 119, 133–35 (1977).
324 See Greer, 424 US at 839–40 (upholding a military base policy of prohibiting partisan political speech); Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc, 452
US 640, 642, 655 (1981) (concluding that a state fair could limit speech access to a designated part of the fairgrounds); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc v Lee,
505 US 672, 685 (1992) (holding that an airport terminal could prohibit First Amendment
access).
325 Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37, 44–
45 (1983).
322
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the Burger Court construed the scope of speakers’ First Amendment rights more narrowly than the Warren Court had. In particular, the Court failed to enforce the requirement that, when the
government regulates speech in the public forum, it must leave
open ample alternative channels for those disparately affected by
its regulation to advance their views.326 When analyzing the constitutionality of time, place, or manner laws, the Court focused
almost entirely on the question of whether the law furthered a
constitutionally legitimate purpose and paid virtually no heed to
the effect that the law might have on the expressive freedom of
those who had ideas they wished to disseminate but no money to
pay for speech.327
The result of the Court’s much more negative, and much more
abstract, approach to the delimitation of free speech rights was a
body of law that was much more similar, both in its doctrinal
structure and in its distributive effects, to Lochner-era due process jurisprudence than was previously true. Not only did the
Burger Court’s almost entirely negative view of the free speech
guarantee lead it to ignore the social and economic facts that
Pound and other realists criticized the Lochner Court for ignoring, it also led the Court to conclude, just as the Lochner Court
had before it, that the government could not interfere with the
operations of the private market in order to achieve redistributive
aims.
Specifically, in Buckley v Valeo328 in 1976, the Court rejected
the idea that the government could constitutionally restrict
spending on election-related speech in an effort to prevent the
very wealthy from using their money to buy access to politicians,
thereby preventing those without as much money from having a
meaningful opportunity to do the same.329 The idea that campaign
326 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Burger Court and the Political Process: Whose First
Amendment?, 10 Harv J L & Pub Pol 21, 23 (1987) (“The [Burger] Court has, in truth, paid
only lip-service to the ‘alternative means’ inquiry.”).
327 The Court held as much explicitly in Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781,
791 (1989) (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.”).
328 424 US 1 (1976).
329 Id at 48–49, 143. The government had argued that a federal law that prohibited
individuals from spending more than $1,000 annually on campaign-related speech was
necessary to “lessen the disproportionate advantage, the distorting effect, of wealthy special interest groups, and to increase opportunities for meaningful participation by ordinary
citizens, as voters, supporters and candidates.” Brief for the Attorney General and the
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finance regulation was necessary in order to prevent the very
wealthy from monopolizing the market in political influence was,
by the time Buckley came along, a very well-established justification for restrictions on corporate spending on campaign-related
speech, and one the Court had previously relied on to uphold a
campaign finance law of this sort against a First Amendment
challenge.330 In Buckley, however, the Court declared, in a per curiam opinion, that “the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”331 And then, in a somewhat ironic twist, it added, “The
First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment
of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion.”332
Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the opinion in
Buckley should be regarded as “a direct heir to Lochner.”333 This
is certainly true. By rejecting the possibility that a law that
sought to limit the freedom of the more powerful in order to promote the interests of the less powerful could ever further a constitutionally valid public purpose, the Court effectively imported
into modern free speech law the prohibition against class legislation that played such an important role in Lochner-era due process jurisprudence, and in Lochner itself.334
Buckley does not demonstrate, however, as Sunstein suggests, the existence of an unbroken jurisprudential tradition. It
does not show that Lochner has, as he put it, never “been entirely
overruled.”335 Buckley instead demonstrates the important, if rather underappreciated, shift in free speech doctrine that took
place in the early 1970s that made it much more Lochnerian than
it had previously been. After all, only seven years earlier, the
Federal Election Commission, Buckley v Valeo, Nos 75-436, 75-437, *23 (US filed Oct 21,
1975) (available on Westlaw at 1975 WL 171459).
330 See United States v International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO), 352 US 567, 568, 589–91 (1957).
331 Buckley, 424 US at 48–49.
332 Id at 49.
333 Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 884 (cited in note 5).
334 See Gillman, Constitution Besieged at 128–29 (cited in note 27) (“[Although]
Peckham’s majority opinion [in Lochner] . . . does not explicitly rely on the language of
unequal, partial, or class legislation,” it ultimately concluded that the New York law was
impermissible because its object was “‘simply to regulate the hours of labor between the
master and his employees,’ and [thereby] . . . use [ ] government power to favor certain
groups at the expense of others.”), quoting Lochner, 198 US at 64.
335 Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 918 (cited in note 5).
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Warren Court had held quite unequivocally that the First Amendment did permit the government to restrict the speech of some in
order to enhance the speech of others when it upheld the FCC
right of reply regulations in Red Lion. The gulf between the view
of the First Amendment articulated in Red Lion and in Buckley is
significant, and startling.
Critics are not wrong, then, when they trace the Lochnerian
tendencies of contemporary free speech jurisprudence to changes
that the Burger Court made to the existing body of First Amendment law. They are simply wrong in what they identify as the
pivotal decisions. It was not the decisions in Virginia Pharmacy
and Bellotti that made free speech law skeptical of government
power, and deferential to private interests, in many of the same
ways that the Lochner-era due process cases were. It was instead
all the other decisions in which the Court construed the guarantee
of freedom of speech to protect, but to do little more than protect,
the expressive autonomy of property owners that did so.
In fact, the commercial speech cases represented an important exception to the Burger Court’s general tendency to prioritize the autonomy interests of the property owner/speaker above
all other interests and concerns. This is because, in those cases
and very few others, the Court continued to allow the government
to limit what speakers could use their property to say, when doing
so promoted what Justice John Paul Stevens described in 1996 as
a “fair bargaining process.”336 Although the Court justified the different rules it applied in commercial speech cases by pointing to
what it claimed were inherent or “commonsense” differences between commercial and noncommercial speech, in fact, none of the
differences the Court identified stand up to critical scrutiny.337 Instead, one can understand the different rules the Court applied
336 44 Liquormart, 517 US at 501. Another set of cases in which the Court continued
to take seriously the threat of private power involved, ironically enough, campaign finance
regulation. See notes 328–32 and accompanying text.
337 Specifically, the Court argued that because “[t]he truth of commercial speech . . .
may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than . . . news reporting or political commentary” and “there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation,” a “different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired.” Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771 n 24. The
Court provided no evidence to substantiate its assertions about the “commonsense differences” between commercial speech and other kinds, and there is good reason to be skeptical of them. Id at 771 n 24. As Professor Martin Redish has pointed out, many statements
in political discourse are as easily verifiable as statements in commercial speech and many
statements in commercial speech are hard to verify. Redish, 130 U Pa L Rev at 633 (cited
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in commercial speech cases to reflect its recognition of the marked
power imbalance that tends to characterize the relationship between the seller and the buyer of commercial goods and services,
due to the fact that the seller knows things about the product that
the buyer cannot know.338
Certainly many of the Court’s commercial speech cases
evince a keen sensitivity to the possibility that commercial sellers
might exploit, manipulate, or deceive their audience, and a willingness to allow the government to take action to prevent them
from doing so.339 In this line of cases, then, and very few others,
the Court continued to act as if “‘liberty’ is . . . something that
may be infringed by other forces as well as by those of government,” and that may “indeed . . . require the positive intervention
of government against those other forces.”340 The result was a body
of law that was much less threatening to the regulatory state than
other areas of Burger Court jurisprudence, and much less
“abstract” in the Poundian sense.
Today, of course, the commercial speech cases represent less
marked an exception to the rest of free speech jurisprudence. It
remains the case even today, however, that the government can
sanction commercial speech when it is false or misleading and can
impose disclosure requirements on commercial speakers that it
absolutely cannot impose on other kinds of speakers.341 Nevertheless, the increasingly strict scrutiny the Court has applied in its

in note 84). Meanwhile, the commercial motives of advertisers may make them not more
resistant to regulation but less. Id (“The possibility of regulation [might] not deter [commercial manufacturers] entirely from advertising, but it might deter [them] from making
certain controversial claims for [their] product[s].”).
338 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771 n 24 (noting that the commercial “advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else”).
339 See, for example, Friedman v Rogers, 440 US 1, 15–16 (1979) (upholding law regulating the use of optometrical trade names because “[r]ather than stifling commercial
speech, [the law] ensures that information regarding optometrical services will be communicated more fully and accurately to consumers than it had been in the past when optometrists were allowed to convey the information through unstated and ambiguous associations with a trade name”); Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 383–84 (1977)
(“[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that
might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.”); Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447, 462
(1978) (upholding a ban on certain kinds of in-person solicitation as a constitutionally permissible means of protecting consumers against “fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of ‘vexatious conduct’”).
340 Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light (cited in note 262).
341 See Post, 48 UCLA L Rev at 26–28, 34–36 (cited in note 147).
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commercial speech cases has obviously had a pronounced deregulatory effect.
This does not mean that it is currently any less of a mistake
than it was in 1976 to argue that modern free speech law resurrects Lochner by extending protection—or too much protection—
to commercial speech and speakers. This is not only because it is
difficult, for all the reasons I suggested earlier, to see why commercial and corporate speech should receive any less protection
than movies, true crime magazines, or the many other overtly
nonpolitical genres of mass entertainment that the First Amendment fully protects. It is also a mistake because it misconceives
the nature of the problem.
The threat that the commercial and corporate speech cases
pose to the government’s ability to “regulate markets . . . to make
life more equitable, safe, [and] healthful” is not a consequence of
the fact that they involve commercially oriented speech.342 The
threat they pose to the government’s ability to regulate markets
is a consequence of the Court’s increasing tendency, in these cases
as in others, to construe the First Amendment as a grant to speakers of almost-absolute freedom to use the expressive resources
that they happen to possess or control for whatever purposes they
desire.
C. Current Examples
Consider in this respect Citizens United, perhaps the most
infamous of all the Roberts Court’s free speech cases. In that case,
the Court invalidated a provision in the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act343 (BCRA) that “prohibit[ed] corporations and
unions from using their general treasury funds to” spend money
on speech that advocated for or against candidates in federal elections.344 The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation that had wanted
to use money to distribute a ninety-minute documentary about
then–presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in the run-up to the
2008 election but feared that if it did so it would violate the law.345
Given that what was at stake was the ability of the corporation to
publicly disseminate speech that clearly touched on pressing public matters, it is hard to quarrel with the majority’s conclusion

342
343
344
345

Purdy, 77 L & Contemp Probs at 203 (cited in note 232).
Pub L No 107-155, 116 Stat 81 (2002), codified at 52 USC § 10101 et seq.
Citizens United, 558 US at 318–20, 365.
Id at 319–21.
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that serious scrutiny of Congress’s means and aims was called
for.346 Nor was this feature of the decision in any way new. By the
time Citizens United was handed down, the Court had recognized
corporate speech rights—and applied rigorous scrutiny—in dozens of corporate speech cases.347
What was significant about the decision was instead its assertion that the government could not justify a law like the one at
issue in the case as a means of ensuring to the not-so-wealthy a
meaningful opportunity to influence the views of elected politicians. Although Buckley had rejected the idea that the government could restrict the campaign spending of some in order to
increase opportunities for participation in the political process by
others, in subsequent decisions, the Court had allowed the government to justify both corporate and noncorporate campaign finance restrictions on very similar grounds.348 It had retreated,
that is, from the strong anti-redistributive position it articulated
in Buckley because it recognized that government regulation of
the political marketplace could further, not just threaten, the
democratic values that the First Amendment protected.
In Citizens United, however, the Court returned to the position it first announced in Buckley in 1976 and reaffirmed that,
under the First Amendment, the government has no legitimate
“interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections.’” 349 Notwithstanding
considerable evidence that infusions of large amounts of money
distort political incentives and policy positions, and thereby undermine the representativeness of the system writ large, the
Court insisted that the government could only regulate the campaign spending when necessary to prevent the direct trading of

346

Id at 340.
Id at 342, citing, among others, Bellotti, 435 US at 778; Tornillo, 418 US 241;
Sullivan, 376 US 254; Joseph Burstyn, 343 US 495.
348 See, for example, Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377, 382, 389
(2000) (upholding a law that limited individual campaign contributions as necessary to
protect against “the broader threat [of] politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors”); Austin, 494 US at 655 (upholding a law limiting corporate spending on
elections as necessary to prevent “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas”). As Professor Richard Hasen noted, in these cases, the Court moved very close to the “equality
rationale” that Buckley rejected. Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S Cal L Rev 885,
894 (2005).
349 Citizens United, 558 US at 350, quoting Buckley, 424 US at 48.
347
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money for political favors, and the appearance of quid pro quo corruption of this sort.350 Ultimately, it was the decision’s narrowing
of the permissible purposes the government could rely upon to
justify campaign finance laws that made it a significant, and
significantly deregulatory, change from prior law—not the fact
that the law it struck down happened to regulate the speech of
corporations.351
Citizens United does not demonstrate, in other words, the
“corporate takeover of the First Amendment.”352 Indeed, the decision’s most pronounced effect has been on campaign finance regulations that do not only apply to corporations.353 It demonstrates
the Court’s increasing tendency to construe the First Amendment
as a shield that private market actors can wield against government regulation, rather than (as it once did) as a mechanism for
safeguarding free speech values against the threat posed to
them by both private and government power. What it also
demonstrates is the Court’s intense hostility toward what
Lochner-era courts would have called class legislation.
A similar story can be told about the decision in Sorrell. In
that case, the Court showed strong disfavor to a law that made
speaker-based distinctions. Specifically, it struck down a
Vermont law that prohibited pharmacies from selling information
about physician prescribing practices—information that federal
law required them to collect—to pharmaceutical marketers without the physician’s consent.354 The Court construed the fact that
Vermont prohibited pharmacies from selling physician prescribing data to pharmaceutical marketers but did not prohibit the
sale of data to other groups, such as public health researchers, to
mean that the law was viewpoint discriminatory, and therefore
presumptively unconstitutional.355 In fact, there was a good reason why the legislature may have prohibited only the sale of data
to pharmaceutical marketers and not to other groups, a reason

350 Id at 359–60. For a discussion of the evidence of what he calls “misalignment” in
voters’ and politicians’ preferences, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign
Finance Law, 101 Va L Rev 1425, 1426–28, 1430 (2015).
351 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 877 (cited in note 5) (noting that an “especially
distinctive” feature of the Lochner Court’s approach was its “sharp limitation of the category of permissible government ends” through its insistence that “[e]fforts to redistribute
resources and paternalistic measures were both constitutionally out of bounds”).
352 Coates, 30 Const Commen at 239 (cited in note 6).
353 Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 Va L Rev 1, 20–21 (2012).
354 Sorrell, 564 US at 557–58.
355 Id at 564–65, 571.
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that had nothing to do with animus against the marketers’ viewpoint: namely, marketers were the only ones who threatened the
privacy interests that the law aimed to protect, by using the data
to target, even harass, doctors who did not prescribe their products with sufficient frequency.356 In his majority opinion, Justice
Anthony Kennedy rejected this justification for the law. “It is
doubtful,” he wrote, “that concern for ‘a few’ physicians who may
have ‘felt coerced and harassed’ by pharmaceutical marketers can
sustain a broad content-based rule like” the Vermont law.357
“Many are those who must endure speech they do not like,” he
added, “but that is a necessary cost of freedom.”358
The decision thus confirmed what Citizens United had suggested: namely, that the Court would look from now on with great
skepticism on laws that made speaker-based distinctions, even
when there were good, noncensorial reasons why the legislature
may have wanted to treat some speakers differently than others.
The result was to make it very difficult for the government to protect some members of the community against speech-related
harms caused by others. In previous decades, the Court had upheld laws that allowed private individuals to choose whether or
not to receive speech that threatened their privacy—and it had
done so even when the speech in question was high-value, not
“purely commercial,” expression.359 The Court now insisted that
Vermont could not do so even when the harm to the speaker’s autonomy was quite minor and the privacy harms the government

356 Id at 575. See also Piety, 29 Cardozo L Rev at 2610–11 (cited in note 116) (discussing the evidence of harassing sales practices).
357 Sorrell, 564 US at 575.
358 Id.
359 The best example of this is the Court’s 1970 decision in Rowan v United States
Post Office Department, 397 US 728 (1970), which upheld a federal law that required commercial and noncommercial advertisers to remove from their mailing lists any homeowners who did not want to receive their materials because they believed they were “erotically
arousing or sexually provocative.” Id at 729–30, 737. The Court held that the law did not
violate the First Amendment because “[n]othing in the Constitution compels us to listen
to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit” and “the citizen cannot be
put to the burden of determining on repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has
altered its material so as to make it acceptable . . . [or] risk that offensive material come
into the hands of his children before it can be stopped.” Id at 737–38. It therefore concluded
that it was permissible for “Congress [to] erect[ ] a wall—or more accurately permit[ ] a
citizen to erect a wall—that no advertiser may penetrate without his acquiescence.” Id at
738. The Vermont law obviously did much the same, even if it operated to protect the
privacy of the medical office, not the home.
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acted to prevent were quite serious.360 This is what is most remarkable about Sorrell, and it has nothing, ultimately, to do with
the fact that it involved commercial speech.
To argue, as Justice Stephen Breyer did in his dissent, that
the decision resurrected Lochner by “substituting judicial for
democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation
is at issue” thus misses what was doctrinally innovative about
it.361 In earlier cases—cases involving for example, the taxation of
newspaper ink—the Court had recognized, sensibly enough, that
when the government intentionally makes it harder for speakers
to acquire the expressive resources they need to engage in speech,
the First Amendment is implicated no less than when the government intentionally restricts their speech.362 In applying more than
rational basis scrutiny to a law that was quite explicitly intended
to affect commercial speech, the Sorrell Court merely followed
this precedent.363
Where the decision broke new ground was in refusing to allow
Vermont to prevent marketers from using information available
to them on the private market to tailor their speech, even when
that information posed a significant threat to doctor privacy, and
even when the restrictions the law imposed could be overridden
by physician consent, and even when the information that the
pharmacies wished to sell existed solely as a consequence of government coercion.364 Doctors did not, in other words, consent to
the collection of their data. They had no choice about it. Nevertheless, although the government created the commodity that

360 Marketers, after all, remained free under the law to say whatever they liked to
doctors during their marketing pitches. They were merely restricted in the range of information they could draw on to tailor their presentation.
361 Sorrell, 564 US at 603 (Breyer dissenting).
362 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460
US 575, 582 (1983) (holding that when the government “single[s] out the press for special
treatment” by imposing a special tax on the ink and paper required to print newspapers,
the “tax . . . cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an overriding governmental interest”).
363 That the law was intended to limit marketing speech was evident from its text,
which prohibited “[p]harmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers . . .
[from] us[ing] prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents.” Sorrell, 564 US at 558–59.
364 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, until Sorrell, the Court had “never found
that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate—whether the information rests in
government files or has remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it.” Id at
588 (Breyer dissenting) (emphasis in original). Nor had it “ever previously applied any
form of ‘heightened’ scrutiny in any even roughly similar case.” Id (emphasis in original).

2020]

The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem

1327

marketers sought to access, the decision in Sorrell imposed
very significant constraints on its ability to subsequently regulate
the commodity’s circulation. In this respect, the decision
demonstrates the same conceptual error as Lochner-era due
process jurisprudence: like the earlier due process decisions, it obscures from view the ways in which government coercion
constructs the market that constitutional doctrine then immunizes from subsequent regulation.365 It construes as a site of individual freedom what is in fact an arena of significant constraint.
To think of Sorrell merely as a case in which the Court failed
to show sufficient deference to the economic policy decisions of the
legislature thus obscures what is generally Lochnerian about it:
namely, its insistence that what the constitutional guarantees of
liberty mean, ultimately, is that the legislature may not impose
even a minor constraint on the freedom of powerful individuals in
order to protect the freedom of weaker and more vulnerable others, even when the legislature helped create the unequal power
relationships at issue in the case. It also obscures the important
similarities between the decision and the many other decisions in
which the Court relied on a similarly rigid distinction between the
public and private spheres to strike down laws that could never
be described as ordinary economic regulation.
Consider in this respect the decision in California Democratic
Party v Jones,366 which struck down a California ballot initiative
that permitted any voter registered in the state to vote in the
party primary election of her choice, regardless of her official
party affiliation.367 In that case too, the Court held that the government could not interfere with the ability of powerful private
speakers (namely, the leaders of the major political parties) to
control the use of an important expressive resource (namely, the
primary process) in an effort to protect the interests of third parties—in this case, the voters of California—without unconstitutionally infringing the First Amendment rights of the powerful.368
365 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 874 (cited in note 5) (“Market ordering under the
common law was understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it
formed the baseline from which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that distinguished [state] action from inaction and neutrality from impermissible partisanship.”).
366 530 US 567 (2000).
367 Id at 570, 586.
368 Id at 574–75. See also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum
L Rev 1367, 1476 n 376 (2003) (“[Even] while acknowledging that California’s use of a
primary election system constituted a delegation of public power to private associations,
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This was the case, the Court held, notwithstanding the very important role that the primary process played in the constitution
of governmental authority itself, and notwithstanding its extensive regulation by the state.369
Or consider Boy Scouts of America v Dale.370 In that case, the
Boy Scouts argued that its First Amendment rights of expressive
association would be violated if it were forced to comply with New
Jersey’s public accommodation law by reinstating a scoutmaster
who it fired because he was gay.371 The Court agreed. It held that
because enforcement of the public accommodations law against
the Boy Scouts would limit the organization’s ability to propagate,
in whatever way it desired, a message of moral cleanliness that
did not include homosexuality, the law violated the First Amendment.372 In holding as much, the Court again paid no attention to
the other expressive interests at stake in the dispute—including
perhaps most importantly the expressive interests of the scoutmaster, James Dale, who lost his position not because of his
sexual orientation but because of his willingness to publicly speak
about his sexual orientation. As Professor Mike Seidman notes,
Dale may very well have been “making a political point when he
insisted on Boy Scout membership” and his performance as scoutmaster may have “forcefully communicated opposition to [the]
the Court held that California’s blanket primary system violated the First Amendment
associational rights of political parties because” of “private autonomy concerns.”).
369 Jones, 530 US at 572–74, 581–82 (rejecting the idea that “party affairs are public
affairs, free of First Amendment protections,” and concluding that when the state “forces
[parties] to adulterate their candidate-selection process . . . by opening it up to persons
wholly unaffiliated with the party,” strict scrutiny applies). As Professor Samuel
Issacharoff notes, it was in its insistence that, because political parties are private entities,
they enjoy a strong First Amendment claim to institutional autonomy, that the decision
departed from, and is difficult to reconcile with, prior decisions that recognized a much
less rigid distinction between the public and private spheres. Samuel Issacharoff, Private
Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan
Competition, 101 Colum L Rev 274, 278–79 (2001):
A review of the caselaw prior to Jones reveals that, as a purely doctrinal matter,
the claim of the major political parties to formal institutional autonomy from
state regulation is at best a weak rights claim. . . . The reason that the rights
claim of the political parties is weak—and here it may be useful to focus on the
major political parties—is not simply that no such positive claims had heretofore
been recognized in the caselaw. Rather, the ability to make a full-throated demand for autonomy from state regulation is compromised by the fact that the
present party system is so fundamentally the product of a heavily regulated electoral arena.
370
371
372

530 US 640 (2000).
Id at 646.
Id at 650, 655, 659.
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negative stereotypes about male homosexuals.”373 Nevertheless,
the Court spent not a word of its opinion discussing the impact
that nonenforcement of the New Jersey law might have on Dale’s
free speech rights or, for that matter, on the associational rights
of boys who signed up for the Boy Scouts without necessarily
knowing its policy positions.374 It did so because it assumed that
the only thing that the First Amendment protected was the negative right of the Boy Scouts to speak, not the positive right of
men like Dale to participate in the public realm that the state
public accommodations law had delimited.
In all these cases, and many more, the Court interpreted the
guarantee of freedom of speech, just as Lochner-era courts once
interpreted the guarantee of due process, as a guarantee of private freedom from government regulation, rather than as a guarantee of anything more positive.375 The result is that today, the
First Amendment makes it difficult in many areas of law for the
government to protect members of the political community
against speech-related harms that are the product of private
action, while doing nothing to ensure that “[f]reedom of speech . . .
[is] available to all, not merely to those who can pay their
own way.”376
It is in this respect that contemporary free speech law “resurrects Lochner.” What this means is that to solve the First
Amendment’s Lochner problem, it will not be sufficient to do what
Chief Justice Rehnquist and, more recently, Justice Breyer have
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Seidman, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1548–49 (cited in note 281).
As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, there was very little evidence that the Boy
Scouts did anything to inform its members of its views on homosexuality—in fact, to the
contrary. Dale, 530 US at 672 (Stevens dissenting) (noting that the policy on homosexuality was “never publicly expressed” and that the Boy Scouts’ “public posture—to the world
and to the Scouts themselves—remained . . . one of tolerance”) (emphasis in original).
375 Recent cases that similarly construe the First Amendment in a strongly negative
and “abstract” manner include Janus v American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S Ct 2448, 2486 (2018) (holding unconstitutional on free
speech grounds laws that require workers represented by labor unions to pay those unions
monthly dues); National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra, 138 S Ct 2361,
2368, 2378 (2018) (striking down a state law that required crisis pregnancy clinics to provide potential customers with information about the availability of free or low-cost medical
services, including abortion); and, as I have elsewhere written about, Manhattan Community Access Corp v Halleck, 139 S Ct 1921, 1934 (2019). See Genevieve Lakier, Manhattan
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck: Property Wins Out over Speech on the Supposedly
Free-Speech Court, 3 ACS S Ct Rev 125, 161–63 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/GA5J
-4SGP. This is obviously just a representative sample and doesn’t touch on what is transpiring in the lower courts.
376 Murdock, 319 US at 111.
374
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suggested courts should do to avoid repeating the errors of the
past—namely, deny constitutional protection to commercial
speech and corporate speakers, or limit how broadly it applies.
Limiting the scope of constitutional protection in that way will
only blunt the anti-redistributive force of contemporary doctrine
to some degree, while leaving commercial speakers and audiences
defenseless against repressive, status-quo-promoting legislation
of the kind I discussed in the previous Part. Moreover, it will do
nothing to ensure that those without economic resources will have
anything like a meaningful opportunity to participate in democratic public discourse.
To avoid repeating the errors of the Lochner Court, what is
needed is not a change to the rules that determine when heightened scrutiny applies but a change to the rules that govern
heightened scrutiny. What is needed is to resuscitate the more
positive, and more economically sensitive, conception of constitutional liberty that the New Deal and later the Warren Courts employed in their free speech cases. In the next and final Part, I
briefly sketch out what this would look like more concretely.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
As the previous Part suggests, contemporary free speech law
is not Lochner-like merely because, like early twentieth-century
freedom of contract jurisprudence, it imposes significant, albeit
limited, constraints on the legislature’s ability to engage in economic regulation.377 It is Lochner-like in many other ways as well.
Three similarities between contemporary free speech law and
Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine are particularly important to highlight. The first is the tendency of both bodies of law
to construe the guarantee of liberty (be it a substantive due process liberty, or the right to free speech) in almost purely negative
terms, as a right the individual possesses against the state, rather
than as a guarantee of something positive (a minimally fair bargaining process, say, or a reasonable opportunity to be heard).

377 For an example of how limited the constraints the First Amendment imposes on
the legislature’s ability to make economic policy can be when those rules shore up the
rights of property owners, one need only look at contemporary copyright law. See generally
Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev 354 (cited in note 9). When decrying the economically deregulatory
tendencies of contemporary free speech law, it is important not to forget the extent to
which contemporary free speech law—like Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine—naturalizes existing market relations and the laws that create them, and thereby helps immunize those laws from constitutional challenge.
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This feature of Lochner-era due process jurisprudence was well
recognized at the time. Professor Pound argued, for example, that
one of the factors that led courts to employ, in freedom of contract
cases, a “legal conception of the relation of employer and employee
[that was] so at variance with the common knowledge of mankind” was their “hostil[ity] to legislation,” and tendency to “tak[e]
a minimum of law-making to be the ideal.”378 It is also a feature of
constitutional doctrine that the New Deal Court quite selfconsciously rejected.379 But it is a view of constitutional liberty that
the Court has quite unequivocally embraced in its free speech cases
over the past four decades—and not only in Tornillo, where this
negative-rights-only conception of the First Amendment was perhaps most explicitly laid out. The view is also present in the many
other cases the Court has handed down since then in which it has
interpreted the First Amendment to mean that the government
may only limit the ability of the speaker to dictate the expressive
uses to which his property shall be put when it can show a truly
compelling purpose and very narrowly tailored means.
A second similarity between the two bodies of law is the tendency of both to define the sphere of negative liberty that the constitution protects by reference to existing property rights. This
was obviously true of Lochner-era freedom of contract cases.380
But it is also true, although less obviously so, of contemporary
free speech law, as the previous Part illustrates. The result is a

378

Pound, 18 Yale L J at 454, 457 (cited in note 11).
In his influential opinion in Barnette, for example, Justice Jackson declared it to
be the difficult but important task of the Court to “translat[e] the majestic generalities of
the Bill of Rights, conceived” when the reigning “philosophy [was] that the individual was
the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental
restraints,” into rules that could work in a society “in which the laissez-faire concept . . .
has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly
sought through . . . expanded and strengthened governmental controls.” 319 US at 639–
40. See also notes 275–87 and accompanying text.
380 Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578, 589 (1897), defining the liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause to include
379

not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person . . . but the . . . right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation;
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
Later decisions, recognizing a due process right to control the upbringing of one’s children,
can also be understood in property terms. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
“Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm & Mary L
Rev 995 (1992).
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body of law that is in some respects highly skeptical of state power
(when it intrudes upon the expressive autonomy of another) and
in other ways highly deferential to it (when it exercises its own
power as employer or property owner).381
Finally, like Lochner-era due process jurisprudence, contemporary free speech law relies on what Pound called an “academic
theory of equality” and what I have called elsewhere a “formal
equality rule.”382 Just as it did in its Lochner-era due process
cases, the contemporary Court assumes that implicit in the guarantee of expressive freedom is a guarantee of equal treatment—
and specifically, a guarantee that the government will treat all
speakers identically, regardless of the economic or social factors
that distinguish them. It is its commitment to formal equality
that helps explain the Lochner Court’s palpable hostility to laws
that aimed to protect workers against employers, and that also
explains the palpable distaste the Court showed to redistributive
campaign finance regulation in Buckley and Citizens United.383
These three features of contemporary free speech jurisprudence do a great deal to explain why it is that the First Amendment has today become, as Professor Rebecca Tushnet put it, “the
new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere with the
regulatory state in a way that substantive due process no longer
allows.”384 They also explain why the First Amendment provides
relatively little protection to other groups—government whistleblowers, for example, or political protestors.385 But they are not

381 Compare Citizens United, 558 US at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental
power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”), with Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410, 421 (2006) (denying First Amendment protection against employer discipline to any speech made by public employees “pursuant to
their official duties”).
382 Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 Colum
L Rev 2117, 2131 (2018).
383 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 884 (cited in note 5) (“Buckley, like Lochner, grew
out of an understanding that for constitutional purposes, the existing distribution of
wealth must be taken as simply ‘there,’ and that efforts to change that distribution are
impermissible.”).
384 Tushnet, 70 Food & Drug L J at 26 (cited in note 121).
385 See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 Tex L Rev 581, 585 (2006) (noting the aggressive use in recent years of facially neutral time, place, or manner laws to
“control [ ] just the sort of speech the First Amendment ought to protect. . . . Geometric
precision is being utilized to marginalize dissent, to capture and confine it”); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski Jr, Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 93 Ind L J 267, 292
(2018) (“The Supreme Court [ ] has not provided robust protection for government employees who engage in whistleblowing activities.”).
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immutable. Nor, as the previous Part indicates, are they hardwired into the modern speech tradition.
For over four decades—from the early 1930s until the early
1970s—the Court interpreted the First Amendment, specifically
the Speech and Press Clauses, as an affirmative guarantee, not
just a prohibition, against certain kinds of state action. In case
after case, it insisted that what the First Amendment provided
individuals was not simply, and not even primarily, a sphere of
personal liberty in which the state may not intrude, but a particular kind of social institution—namely, the democratic public
sphere and, more broadly, the democratic system of government.
Indeed, on very few occasions did the Court construe the First
Amendment to protect speech that did not play an important role
in the formation of democratic public opinion in order to vindicate
individual expressive autonomy. (I can think, in fact, of only one
occasion on which it did so—the 1969 decision in Stanley v
Georgia.386) Instead, it made clear that the “core value” the First
Amendment protected was the individual right to meaningfully
participate, either as speaker or as listener, in a “free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”387
It was because it guaranteed individuals this incredibly important positive right—a right that was “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom”—that the
New Deal, and later Warren, Courts argued that the vigorous judicial enforcement of First Amendment rights was appropriate,
even in a post-Lochner age.388 The crucial role that the First
Amendment played in facilitating and protecting democratic selfgovernment is also what led the Court to conclude, in Marsh and
in other cases, that First Amendment rights enjoyed a “preferred
position” compared to other kinds of rights, such as property.389
And it explains the Court’s insistence that First Amendment doctrine pay attention to how economic and social forces, not just legal rules, shape the exercise of expressive freedom. After all, if
the First Amendment protects not just individual liberty but the
vitality of the democratic public sphere, it obviously matters

386 394 US 557, 564, 568 (1969) (holding that the government may not punish the
possession of unprotected obscenity in the home because doing so intrudes too far on “the
privacy of a person’s own home”).
387 Pickering v Board of Education, 391 US 563, 573 (1968).
388 See Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 327 (1937).
389 Marsh, 326 US at 509.
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whether the economic and social conditions that enable it to flourish do or do not exist. This is why, in many different cases, the
Court assumed that whether state action violates the First
Amendment depends not only on the purposes that motivate it, or
the form it takes; what also matters are its effects on the robustness and vitality of public debate.390
To ensure that the First Amendment does in fact continue to
perform the important, representation-reinforcing function it is
supposed to perform in the post-Lochner constitutional order—
and that it does not prevent the government from regulating the
market, and other spheres of “private” life, when doing so does
not pose a threat to democratic values—it is this, more positive,
less property-based, and less formalist view of freedom of speech
that we would need to recapture. Doing so would not require a
radical break with the modern free speech tradition. To the contrary, what the preceding Part suggests is that a more positive,
less formalist approach in free speech cases would be much more
in keeping with the modern free speech tradition, at least as the
New Deal Court understood it, than the contemporary Court’s
much more laissez-faire approach. It would, however, require significant change to a good number of contemporary doctrinal rules.
Taking seriously the possibility that “‘liberty’ is . . . something that may be infringed by other forces as well as by those of
government,”391 would require, among other things, rejecting the
idea that under the First Amendment the government “may
[never] restrict the speech of some . . . in order to enhance the relative voice of others.”392 This is because, in cases where private
speakers possess monopoly or oligopoly control over important
sites of public expression—the radio waves, say, or the newspapers—the formal equality rule that these cases announced will
make it very difficult for the government to do what the New Deal
Court thought it was incumbent on the legislature as well as the
courts to do: namely, safeguard the vitality of public debate from
private, as well as government, repression. If one recognizes that
privately owned property provides an important site for the operation of the democratic public sphere, it makes no sense to interpret the First Amendment as a constraint on the censorial impulses of state actors but to require legislators to give free rein to

390
391
392

See notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light (cited in note 262).
Buckley, 424 US at 48–49.
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the censorial impulses of private actors. Similarly, if one presumes that the “core” First Amendment value is a political system
in which all members of the community have a meaningful opportunity to have their say, it is difficult to see why the legislature
acts impermissibly when it imposes limits on campaign spending
in an effort to ensure that both the wealthy and the poor have a
meaningful opportunity to influence the positions that politicians
adopt.
This is not to say that the government should have free rein
to restrict the speech of powerful private actors. Recognizing the
threat that the exercise of private power can pose to free speech
values does not require ignoring the threat that government
power can pose to those same values. The question in all cases
should be: Does the regulation of private speech enhance the diversity and vitality of public debate, and the health of the system
writ large, by preventing the monopolization of an important expressive resource? Or does it do the opposite, by requiring private
actors to promote a government-favored point of view or by otherwise retarding, rather than enhancing, political debate among
private citizens? This is, more or less, the question that guided
the Court’s analysis in the early- and mid-twentieth-century
media-concentration cases.393 But it is a question that the contemporary Court’s rigid embrace of a formal equality rule takes completely off the table.
Embracing a more positive, more materialist conception of
freedom of speech would also require courts to take more seriously than they currently do the idea that First Amendment
rights enjoy a privileged position when compared to property
rights. This proposition follows directly from the organizing principle of the New Deal settlement—namely, that economic rights
need not be safeguarded against the will of democratic majorities,
but civil rights, such as the right to freedom of speech, do. It is
nonetheless a view of the relationship between property and free
speech rights that the current doctrine almost entirely rejects—
the result being to produce a jurisprudence that is much more effective in protecting the speech of some than others.

393 See, for example, Red Lion, 395 US at 392–93 (noting that if evidence emerges
that the FCC right of reply regulations have “the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage” the Court will revisit their “constitutional
implications”).
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Finally, a more positive conception of freedom of speech
would require courts to take much more seriously than they currently do the constitutional and subconstitutional interests of listeners and third parties. The Court’s embrace of a largely negative view of freedom of speech—its assumption that what the
First Amendment protects, and all that it protects, is the right of
the speaker to be free of intentional government efforts to limit
what she can and cannot say—has prevented it from having to
deal with, or even recognize, the often rather significant rights
conflicts that exist in First Amendment cases. Dale is by no means
unique in this regard. All of the cases discussed in the previous
Part can be reframed as cases in which the speaker’s exercise of
his or her expressive freedom burdened—or directly precluded—
other people’s exercise of their expressive freedom, or infringed
upon some important right or interest (for example, the doctors’
right to privacy in Sorrell). In none of them, however, did the
Court spend any time considering the difficult question of how to
weigh the competing interests. Instead, it presumed that the only
interest of any constitutional significance was that of the speaker.
It is this single-minded focus on the rights of the speaker that
helps explain a great deal of what is wrong with contemporary
free speech law.
The result of these changes to free speech doctrine would be
a body of law that would be much better than the contemporary
regime in reconciling the vigorous judicial enforcement of First
Amendment rights with an active regulatory state. This is because it would permit the government to restrict the expressive
freedom of market participants—in some cases, significantly—
when doing so does not meaningfully hamper their ability to participate in public discourse and meanwhile advances the kinds of
substantial government purposes the First Amendment has traditionally required to justify the regulation of public speech.394 It
would, for example, almost certainly lead to the conclusion that
the data privacy law struck down in Sorrell is constitutionally unproblematic. This is because that law did not impose anything but
the most minimal burden on the marketers’ ability to publicly
communicate their point of view, or to otherwise shape public
attitudes about the pharmaceuticals they marketed. Nor did it
threaten, in any way, the right the Court worried about in

394

See Schneider, 308 US at 161.
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Stanley—namely, the individual “right to be let alone.”395 If anything, this was the interest that Vermont was trying to protect.
Meanwhile, the law promoted important interests—chief among
these being the doctor’s interest in preserving the privacy of her
prescribing practices, and the patient’s interest in a doctorpatient relationship that is as unconstrained as possible.396
A view of the First Amendment that conceived it primarily as
a safeguard of a robust, diverse, and inclusive public sphere
would also likely lead to the conclusion that the law struck down
in Citizens United was constitutionally permissible, although the
question is a somewhat closer one. Although the law obviously
made it more difficult for corporations to engage in protected political speech in the days leading up to a federal election, the burden it imposed on their speech was not terribly onerous. This is
because, under the BCRA, corporations remained entirely free to
use the money in separate corporate-funded political action committees (PACs) to pay for whatever speech they liked, right up
until an election.397 This suggests that the primary effect of the
provision that the Court struck down was not to “muffle[ ] the
voices that best represent the most significant segments of the
economy”—as Justice Kennedy asserted in his majority opinion—
but to channel corporate spending to the more heavily regulated
and more transparent PACs.398 Although it is true that, because
only certain persons could contribute money to corporate PACs,
their coffers might be more limited than the corporations’ general
treasury funds, when one considers the many benefits associated
with a more transparent campaign finance system, as well as the
constitutionally protected interests of the voters to participate in
a democratic political system in which they enjoy a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, these restrictions on the expressive autonomy of corporate speakers seem easy to justify. Meanwhile,
there is no reason to think that the law the Court struck down
posed any threat to individual privacy interests, or to any other
core feature of individual autonomy. It certainly posed no threat
to the individual right to be let alone.

395 Stanley, 394 US at 564, quoting Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis dissenting).
396 Brief for Petitioners, Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, No 10-779, *46–47 (US filed Feb
22, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 661712).
397 Citizens United, 558 US at 393–94 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
398 See id at 354.
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At the same time, a First Amendment conceived primarily as
a safeguard of democratic government, rather than private autonomy, would not give the government a blank check to regulate
speech however it desired. It should be, for example, as difficult
to justify paternalistic speech regulations under this less
Lochnerian conception of the First Amendment as it is under the
contemporary, speaker-autonomy-focused approach. This is because when the government deliberately denies information to
people for the purpose of influencing their behavior, it not only
violates their autonomy but takes from them a fundamental prerogative of democratic citizenship: namely, the power to decide,
both for oneself and for the political community, what the appropriate ends to pursue and values to vindicate are.399 This explains
why a strong prohibition against paternalism has been a core feature of the modern free speech tradition since the early twentieth
century.400 And what it means is that the Court was correct in
striking down the ban on pharmaceutical price advertising in
Virginia Pharmacy, and incorrect when it upheld Puerto Rico’s
deeply paternalistic ban on casino advertising in Posadas.
Laws that discriminate against particular kinds of speakers
for no good reason also pose an obvious problem to a First Amendment conceived primarily as a vehicle for guaranteeing the diversity and vitality of public debate. This is why the decision in
Citizens United is less clearly incorrect, when assessed under this
alternative view of the First Amendment, than the decision in
Sorrell. After all, Vermont had very good reasons to think that
pharmaceutical marketers, and only pharmaceutical marketers,
threatened the privacy harms that it sought to prevent when it
enacted the law that the Court struck down. It is far less obvious
that Congress had good reasons to single out corporations for special treatment when it enacted the BCRA. As Justice Kennedy
noted in his majority opinion, wealthy individuals possess the
same power as wealthy corporations to use their money to buy
political influence.401 And in fact, wealthy individuals spend a

399 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
Colum L Rev 334, 356 (1991) (“When the government violates the persuasion principle, it
has determined that people will, to a degree, pursue its—the government’s—objectives,
instead of their own.”).
400 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm &
Mary L Rev 189, 212–13 (1983).
401 Citizens United, 558 US at 356.
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great deal more on elections than wealthy corporations.402 This
raises serious doubts that “there [was] an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment”
that BCRA applied.403 Of course, Congress may have had other
reasons to treat corporations differently under the BCRA than
natural persons. It may have wanted to protect the rights of
shareholders, for example, by limiting the extent to which corporate directors could use corporate moneys for political ends with
which they disagreed. Or it might have believed, understandably
enough given Buckley, that it could not impose restrictions on natural persons similar to those that it imposed on corporations.
The point here is simply that a more positive, less rigidly
speaker-autonomy-focused conception of the First Amendment
would not mean an abdication of courts’ responsibility to safeguard the independence of the democratic public sphere. What it
would do is enable a more nuanced reconciliation between free
speech values and regulatory power than current doctrine allows.
It would permit the government to regulate all kinds of market
actors (not just commercial speakers) when doing so was necessary to protect consumers against misleading, deceptive, coercive,
or harassing behavior. But it would not allow the government to
regulate commercial speech, or for that matter, any constitutionally valuable expression, in order to shape the views and behaviors of members of the public, except when it had a genuinely compelling need to do so.404
The result would be a jurisprudence that would not need to
demarcate a particular category of low-value speech to protect
consumers from the kinds of harms that the commercial speech
precedents, until recently at least, have allowed the government
to guard against. Such harms, after all, have nothing to do with
the intrinsic value of the speech; instead, they are the product of
the power inequality that the seller of a commercial good possesses, by virtue of his or her greater knowledge about the good
that he or she sells. There is consequently no obvious reason why
the government should be able to protect members of the public

402 Stephanopoulos, 101 Va L Rev at 1426 (cited in note 350) (“Almost all [2012 campaign] funding came from individual donors, not corporations or unions.”).
403 Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95 (1972).
404 The Court has suggested, for example, that paternalistic speech regulation might
be justified by a need to prevent consumption of highly addictive goods like cigarettes, so
long as those regulations are sufficiently narrowly tailored. Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly,
533 US 525, 564 (2001).
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against these kinds of harms only when it comes to commercial
advertising and other kinds of commercial speech.405 The result
would be a more consistent, and coherent, body of free speech law:
one that does not need to cabin the scope of its protections by relying upon an unduly formalistic distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech.
More generally, what a more positive conception of the First
Amendment would produce is a body of law that is more sensitive
to the multiple interests implicated in free speech disputes than
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, and one that
would do what courts almost entirely fail to do today: namely,
take seriously the constitutional interests of those who do not
happen to own the expressive resource the government is regulating. It simply cannot be that only property owners possess free
speech rights—and yet this is essentially the result that current
doctrine produces, at least in those areas of free speech law where
the New Deal and Warren Courts’ precedents no longer hold
sway.
Precisely for this reason, however, a First Amendment that
took seriously the threat to free speech interests posed by both
government and private power would also make the constitutional analysis in a good number of cases a lot harder than it is
today. Consider for example Dale. Viewed through a negative autonomy lens, the case is an easy one. If property owners possess
an almost unlimited right to decide the expressive uses to which
their property shall be put, the conclusion that New Jersey violated the First Amendment rights of the Boy Scouts when it forced
the organization to use its property to send a message of tolerance
and equality that it did not want to send is a very easy one to
reach. If we did not assume as much, however, and instead presumed that the constitutionality of enforcing the public accommodations law against the Boy Scouts depends on whether doing so
promotes or threatens the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”
public debate on public matters that the First Amendment protects, then the analysis becomes enormously more complicated.
Then, courts would have to weigh the harm that would be created

405 Indeed, I have previously argued that the decision in Riley v National Federation
of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc, 487 US 781 (1988), is wrong precisely because it fails
to protect listeners in a similarly power-imbalanced relationship with noncommercial
speakers. See Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star After All: West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning of the First Amendment Right
Not to Speak, 13 FIU L Rev 741, 763 (2019).
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were the public accommodations law enforced against the harm
were it not to be. And to figure that out, courts would have to
think carefully not only about the threat that enforcing the public
accommodations law posed to the expressive freedom of the Boy
Scouts; they would also have to think about the alternative avenues that Dale possessed to speak.
This analysis need not be open ended. In other areas of law—
for example, in its libel cases—the Court has crafted relatively
clear-cut rules that are nevertheless responsive to the multiple
and competing interests implicated by the regulation of defamatory speech. One can read the special rules that courts apply
in advertising cases as achieving similar ends, as I suggested
earlier.
Courts can, in other words, do a better job than they currently
do of reconciling the multiple, often conflicting, interests at stake
in First Amendment cases without having to perform, in every
case, a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis or engage in what
the Court has at times described derisively as “ad hoc balancing.”
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court will, at least, have to engage in
balancing of some kind, when fashioning the rules that apply in
different regulatory contexts, and courts of all kinds will have to
pay more attention to social and economic context than they currently do when applying these rules.
We might worry that judges will not be able to adequately
perform the more complicated doctrinal analysis I am calling for,
or that the result of their doing so will be a body of law that fails
to sufficiently protect the independence of the public sphere
against repressive governmental regulation.406 The problem is
that there is no good alternative. This is because, in a society
characterized by tremendous inequality in economic and social
power, simply pushing the reconciliation of competing rights to
the subconstitutional arena of private law means creating a First
Amendment jurisprudence that cannot possibly vindicate the
freedoms it serves.
In this sense, the difficulty of the analysis that a less laissezfaire view of freedom of speech would produce might not be a
drawback, but a virtue of the approach. This is because the task
406 For an argument along these lines see Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective
and the First Amendment, 85 Colum L Rev 449, 471 (1985) (arguing that one tool courts
can use to protect free speech values in periods of heightened repression is to avoid “[c]omplicated, subtle, imaginative legal arguments” and instead “speak . . . in confident tones
that do not invite critical reflection and doubt regarding the importance of free speech”).
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of crafting a set of doctrinal rules that can preserve free speech
against repression from both public and private actors without
effectively constitutionalizing the entire legal domain is a difficult
task, and one that courts and scholars should recognize as such.
Current doctrine obscures the difficult questions posed when the
government restricts the freedom of some in order to protect the
freedom of others by making the analysis unduly formalistic—or
to use Pound’s terminology, “abstract.” As a result, it fails to effectively vindicate free speech values by focusing to its detriment
on only a subset of the interests at stake when the government
regulates speech.
What this means is that the First Amendment’s Lochner
problem isn’t just a problem for the regulatory state; it is a problem for the First Amendment itself.
CONCLUSION
Over one hundred years after it was handed down, Lochner
continues to haunt American constitutional jurisprudence. This is
in part a product of the fact that agreement over what went wrong
in Lochner is so incompletely theorized. As Professor Jamal
Greene has noted, the fact that “there is disagreement, even irreconcilable disagreement as to why” they were wrong makes anticanonical decisions like Lochner useful weapons in legal argument
because they “enable[ ] multiple sides . . . to use the anticanon as
a rhetorical trump.”407 But it is also a product, as this Article has
shown, of the Court’s tendency to repeat the mistakes of its past.
Recent concern about the Lochnerian tendencies of contemporary free speech law is not merely rhetorical. There are significant
and important similarities between Lochner-era due process jurisprudence and contemporary free speech law—albeit, not the similarities that most contemporary critics point to. These similarities
are important to understand not only the First Amendment’s past
but also its present and future.
This is because another lesson Lochner teaches is that there
may be political limits to how anti-redistributive constitutional
doctrine can become. If the strongly anti-redistributive tendencies
of contemporary free speech progress unabated, a political reckoning may arrive sooner rather than later. If that occurs, it will be
important to remember that the First Amendment was not always
wedded to a laissez-faire conception of constitutional liberty and
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that it need not always be. Recovering the past of the First Amendment may be key to preserving its meaning for future generations.
This Article begins that work.

